ICANN New gTLD Application

The proposed .HOME gTLD will benefit registrants, Internet users and others by, among other reasons, providing a trusted and valued space for NAR, REALTORS®, NAR members, NAR affiliates, NAR licensees and other NAR-contracted parties to provide home buying and home selling related information. Use of the .HOME gTLD under NAR’s stewardship will provide new on-line opportunities for REALTORS®, other NAR-related entities and users alike.

NAR, REALTORS®, NAR members, NAR affiliates, NAR licensees and other NAR contracted parties will benefit from the .HOME gTLD by having expanded domain options (an example of beneficial TLD competition). For example, a REALTOR® will be able to use a domain for marketing their services comprising a term which is inherently associated with the professional services offered, including the geographic location(s) of such offerings. Such an appropriate domain may not be available in other TLD’s. NAR members, affiliates, licensees, etc. will further benefit from using a domain in a trusted, valued gTLD that is associated with NAR’s Vision.

NAR-related entities will benefit from the .HOME gTLD by having a new opportunity to provide home buying and home selling related services to NAR members and consumers alike. For example, NAR-related entities may provide content, such as home buying tips, or content services, such as home listings, to a NAR member’s website at an appropriate .HOME second-level domain.

Awareness of the existence of the .HOME gTLD will also benefit Internet users -- such awareness will create new choice within the DNS for how to access and locate home-related information. Users will also benefit from the trusted, valued nature of the .HOME space. Users can be confident that a domain in the .HOME gTLD is associated with NAR, a REALTOR®, an NAR member, an NAR affiliate, NAR licensees and other NAR-contracted parties.

1. The goals of the .HOME gTLD in terms of areas of specialty, service levels and reputation.

NAR and NAR members are associated with NAR’s Vision and other professionalism in the provision of home buying and home selling services, and specifically with adherence with the strict Code of Ethics set forth by NAR. It is NAR’s goal to continue such association under operation and use of the .HOME gTLD. In this regard, NAR anticipates that the same level of specialty associated with its Vision and REALTORS® in the non-digital world, the same level of service provided in association with its Vision and REALTORS® in the non-digital world, and the same level of reputation associated with its Vision and REALTORS® in the non-digital world, will continue in the .HOME gTLD.

NAR and NAR members are associated in a consumer’s mind with NAR’s Vision, NAR’s reputation and the provision of professional home buying and home selling services by those members. Use of a .HOME second level domain, under the stewardship of NAR, should bring forth the same association in the mind of the consumer. Nowhere is NAR’s and reputation better exemplified than the Pledge of Performance and Service which is shared by all REALTORS®, which include the following elements:

a) To protect and promote their clients’ interests while treating all parties honestly.

b) To refrain from exaggeration, misrepresentation, or concealment of pertinent facts related to property or transactions.

c) To not provide professional services where they have any present or contemplated interest in property without disclosing that interest to all affected parties.

d) To make sure that contract details are spelled out in writing and that parties receive copies.

e) To give equal professional service to all clients and customers irrespective of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin.

f) To be knowledgeable and competent in the fields of practice in which they engage or they get assistance from a knowledgeable professional, or disclose any lack of expertise to their client.

g) To paint a true picture in their advertising and in other public representations.

h) To not engage in the unauthorized practice of law.

i) To willingly participate in ethics investigations and enforcement actions.

j) To make only truthful, objective comments about other real estate professionals.

Use of a .HOME second level domain, under the stewardship of NAR, should evoke the same reputation in the mind of the consumer.

2. What the .HOME gTLD will add to the current space in terms of competition, differentiation and innovation.

Creation of .HOME will provide competition to existing TLD’s in the form of a new name space for registration of home-related domain names.

Over time, NAR anticipates a single dedicated name space under the unique .HOME gTLD, in combination with the reputation and professionalism users associate with NAR, NAR members, affiliates, etc., will resonate with users of the Internet to create differentiation that otherwise could not exist in current gTLD’s. Further, provision of the .HOME gTLD as a trusted, valued space due to NAR⁄REALTOR-related registration restrictions will differentiate .HOME from other, untrusted TLD’s. Association in the minds of consumers with the reputation of NAR, NAR’s members, affiliates, etc. and the associated provision of professional home buying and home selling services will differentiate .HOME from other TLD’s which do not benefit from such consumer association, whether by the generic or descriptive nature of the TLD itself, or by association of the TLD with products and⁄or services unrelated to the home buying and home sellling industry, or related to the real estate industry but not associated with NAR or membership in NAR.

While it is difficult to predict in exact terms what future innovation may occur as a result of the existence of the .HOME gTLD, we expect NAR, NAR members, affiliates, etc. to demonstrate the same capacity to innovate and adapt to new media as they have shown for over one hundred years. One possible example of this innovation which NAR intends to explore is the option of providing a hierarchical and intuitive framework for the .HOME namespace by using geographical identifiers as second-level domain names. Such framework could provide an online, single-source identifying function, allowing consumers to locate home buying and selling-related information regarding home for sale within domain-specified geographic areas.

3. User experience goals of the .HOME gTLD.

A goal of .HOME is for users to experience robust DNS industry standards for technical back-end operations, including but not limited to near 100% uptime; timely zone file dissemination; searchable WHOIS capabilities; and additional security measures such as for DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC).

Over time, an additional goal is for users to experience .HOME websites as trusted, valued sources for professional home buying and home selling related information. A goal NAR intends to explore is to provide home sale listings at domains which are associated with geographic and⁄or subject matter terms. Over time, users desiring information relating to home buying and⁄or home selling in a specific area, or information relating to services in a particular type of home sales (such as, for example, condominiums), will be conditioned to navigate to “geographic.HOME” or “subjectmatter.HOME” in order to obtain relevant information.

4. Intended registration policies in the .HOME gTLD in support of the goals listed above.

Consistent with NAR’s mission⁄purpose for the .HOME gTLD, NAR will determine, in its sole discretion, who may register domains in .HOME, and, at least during initial operations of the .HOME gTLD, only NAR, REALTORS®, NAR members, NAR affiliates (including societies and counsels), NAR licensees and parties otherwise in a contractual relationship with NAR will be permitted such registration. To the extent, during initial operations, a registrant⁄REALTOR® lapses in membership as a REALTOR®, or a registrant⁄NAR member ceases to be an NAR member, or a registrant⁄NAR affiliate ceases to be an NAR affiliate, or a registrant⁄NAR licensee ceases to be an NAR licensee, or a registrant⁄NAR contracted-party ceases to be an NAR contracted party, registration of the affected domain will have to be withdrawn. NAR will also determine, in its sole discretion, how domains in .HOME may be used.

During initial operation of the .HOME gTLD, NAR further may elect, in its discretion, to still further restrict who will be permitted registration in .HOME, and to provide other policies and practices relating to registration and use of domains in .HOME, which are reasonably necessary for the management, operations and purpose of the gTLD, consistent with NAR’s Vision, so long as any such restrictions, policies or practices are consistent with the mission⁄purpose of .HOME and the restrictions on registration set forth above. Any such restrictions, policies or practices will be implemented so that the .HOME gTLD can be launched and initially operated in a controlled manner, granting the gTLD the opportunity to fulfill its stated mission(s)⁄purpose(s), and allowing NAR the opportunity to study use of the gTLD and user adoption of the gTLD. Any such restrictions, policies or practices will also allow NAR the ability to explore and implement user experience goals noted above and to find ways of achieving the missions⁄purposes identified above, such as provision of homes-for-sale listings at non-reserved geographic .HOME domains.

NAR will periodically review progress and adoption of the .HOME gTLD with an eye towards considering modification or removal of any such initial operation restrictions, policies or practices. NAR may choose to never remove these restrictions, policies and practices. Alternatively, NAR may choose to allow registrations in .HOME to REALTORS®, NAR members, NAR affiliates, NAR licensees or NAR contracted parties as set forth herein.

As expanded operations under the .HOME gTLD are contemplated (if indeed any such expansions are contemplated), NAR – in its sole discretion – may add, delete, amend or otherwise modify registration restrictions, policies and practices, in support of the goals listed above. NAR may adopt use policies consistent with the principles set forth herein and further consistent with NAR’s Vision.

5. Measures for protecting the privacy and confidentiality of registrants and users.

Applicant does not at this time propose any measures for protecting the privacy of confidential information of registrants or users of .HOME domain names, outside of what is required under applicable statute, contract or law.

6. Outreach and communications which will help achieve projected benefits.

The primary outreach and communications that will occur for .HOME will be through NAR, the largest trade association in North America. Through a combination of radio, television, print, and Web advertisements, as well as a syndicated radio show, NAR educates consumers and the media about everything from market conditions to hiring contractors, and then some. Over time, we expect these existing channels of communication to produce widespread awareness for .HOME.

1 CUSTOMARY REGISTRY SERVICES

As Dot Home LLC’s (“DH”) selected provider of backend registry services, Verisign provides a comprehensive system and physical security solution that is designed to ensure a TLD is protected from unauthorized disclosure, alteration, insertion, or destruction of registry data. Verisign’s system addresses all areas of security including information and policies, security procedures, the systems development lifecycle, physical security, system hacks, break-ins, data tampering, and other disruptions to operations. Verisign’s operational environments not only meet the security criteria specified in its customer contractual agreements, thereby preventing unauthorized access to or disclosure of information or resources on the Internet by systems operating in accordance with applicable standards, but also are subject to multiple independent assessments as detailed in the response to Question 30, Security Policy. Verisign’s physical and system security methodology follows a mature, ongoing lifecycle that was developed and implemented many years before the development of the industry standards with which Verisign currently complies. Please see the response to Question 30, Security Policy, for details of the security features of Verisign’s registry services.

Verisign’s registry services fully comply with relevant standards and best current practice RFCs published by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), including all successor standards, modifications, or additions relating to the DNS and name server operations including without limitation RFCs 1034, 1035, 1982, 2181, 2182, 2671, 3226, 3596, 3597, 3901, 4343, and 4472. Moreover, Verisign’s Shared Registration System (SRS) supports the following IETF Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) specifications, where the Extensible Markup Language (XML) templates and XML schemas are defined in RFC 3915, 5730, 5731, 5732, 5733, and 5734. By strictly adhering to these RFCs, Verisign helps to ensure its registry services do not create a condition that adversely affects the throughput, response time, consistency, or coherence of responses to Internet servers or end systems. Besides its leadership in authoring RFCs for EPP, Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC), and other DNS services, Verisign has created and contributed to several now well-established IETF standards and is a regular and long-standing participant in key Internet standards forums.

Figure 23-1 summarizes the technical and business components of those registry services, customarily offered by a registry operator (i.e., Verisign), that support this application. These services are currently operational and support both large and small Verisign-managed registries. Customary registry services are provided in the same manner as Verisign provides these services for its existing gTLDs.

Through these established registry services, Verisign has proven its ability to operate a reliable and low-risk registry that supports millions of transactions per day. Verisign is unaware of any potential security or stability concern related to any of these services.

Registry services defined in the Figures below are not intended to be offered in a manner unique to the new generic top-level domain (gTLD) nor are such services unique to this application’s registry. An additional registry service which DH will offer is the use of first come, first serve (at a higher fixed annual fee) to determine string allocation in appropriate circumstances, such as in allocating any premium names. Yet another service which DH may offer, commonly used in the marketplace today, is the use of RFPs (Request for Proposals) and Auctions to determine string allocation in appropriate circumstances. Another potential service that DH is considering at this time is the imposition of an annual cost recovery based fee to validate registrars that will be providing domain name registration services in the .HOME TLD.

Figure 23-1: See Dot Home LLC_Q23_registry services

As further evidence of Verisign’s compliance with ICANN mandated security and stability requirements, Verisign allocates the applicable RFCs to each of the five customary registry services (items A – E above). For each registry service, Verisign also provides evidence in Figure 23-2 of Verisign’s RFC compliance and includes relevant ICANN prior-service approval actions.

Figure 23-2: See attached

1.1 Critical Operations of the Registry

i. Receipt of Data from Registrars Concerning Registration of Domain Names and Name Servers

See Item A in Figure 23-1 and Figure 23-2.

ii. Provision to Registrars Status Information Relating to the Zone Servers

Verisign is DH’s selected provider of backend registry services. Verisign registry services provisions to registrars status information relating to zone servers for the TLD. The services also allow a domain name to be updated with clientHold, serverHold status, which removes the domain name server details from zone files. This ensures that DNS queries of the domain name are not resolved temporarily. When these hold statuses are removed, the name server details are written back to zone files and DNS queries are again resolved. Figure 23-3 describes the domain name status information and zone insertion indicator provided to registrars. The zone insertion indicator determines whether the name server details of the domain name exist in the zone file for a given domain name status. Verisign also has the capability to withdraw domain names from the zone file in near-real time by changing the domain name statuses upon request by customers, courts, or legal authorities as required.

Figure 23-3: See attached

iii. Dissemination of TLD Zone Files

See Item B in Figure 23-1 and Figure 23-2.

iv. Operation of the Registry Zone Servers

Verisign is DH’s selected provider of backend registry services. Verisign, as a company, operates zone servers and serves DNS resolution from 76 geographically distributed resolution sites located in North America, South America, Africa, Europe, Asia, and Australia. Currently, 17 DNS locations are designated primary sites, offering greater capacity than smaller sites comprising the remainder of the Verisign constellation. Verisign also uses Anycast techniques and regional Internet resolution sites to expand coverage, accommodate emergency or surge capacity, and support system availability during maintenance procedures. Verisign operates DH’s gTLD from a minimum of eight of its primary sites (two on the East Coast of the United States, two on the West Coast of the United States, two in Europe, and two in Asia) and expands resolution sites based on traffic volume and patterns. Further details of the geographic diversity of Verisign’s zone servers are provided in the response to Question 34, Geographic Diversity. Moreover, additional details of Verisign’s zone servers are provided in the response to Question 32, Architecture and the response to Question 35, DNS Service.

v. Dissemination of Contact and Other Information Concerning Domain Name Server Registrations

See Item C in Figure 23-1 and Figure 23-2.

2 OTHER PRODUCTS OR SERVICES THE REGISTRY OPERATOR IS REQUIRED TO PROVIDE BECAUSE OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A CONSENSUS POLICY

Verisign, DH’s selected provider of backend registry services, is a proven supporter of ICANN’s consensus-driven, bottom-up policy development process whereby community members identify a problem, initiate policy discussions, and generate a solution that produces effective and sustained results. Verisign currently provides all of the products or services (collectively referred to as services) that the registry operator is required to provide because of the establishment of a Consensus Policy. For the .HOME gTLD, Verisign implements these services using the same proven processes and procedures currently in-place for all registries under Verisign’s management. Furthermore, Verisign executes these services on computing platforms comparable to those of other registries under Verisign’s management. Verisign’s extensive experience with consensus policy required services and its proven processes to implement these services greatly minimize any potential risk to Internet security or stability. Details of these services are provided in the following subsections. It shall be noted that consensus policy services required of registrars (e.g., Whois Reminder, Expired Domain) are not included in this response. This exclusion is in accordance with the direction provided in the question’s Notes column to address registry operator services.

2.1 Inter-Registrar Transfer Policy (IRTP)

Technical Component: In compliance with the IRTP consensus policy, Verisign, DH’s selected provider of backend registry services, has designed its registration systems to systematically restrict the transfer of domain names within 60 days of the initial create date. In addition, Verisign has implemented EPP and “AuthInfo” code functionality, which is used to further authenticate transfer requests. The registration system has been designed to enable compliance with the five-day Transfer grace period and includes the following functionality:

* Allows the losing registrar to proactively ‘ACK’ or acknowledge a transfer prior to the expiration of the five-day Transfer grace period

* Allows the losing registrar to proactively ‘NACK’ or not acknowledge a transfer prior to the expiration of the five-day Transfer grace period

* Allows the system to automatically ACK the transfer request once the five-day Transfer grace period has passed if the losing registrar has not proactively ACK’d or NACK’d the transfer request.

Business Component: All requests to transfer a domain name to a new registrar are handled according to the procedures detailed in the IRTP. Dispute proceedings arising from a registrarʹs alleged failure to abide by this policy may be initiated by any ICANN-accredited registrar under the Transfer Dispute Resolution Policy. DH’s compliance office serves as the first-level dispute resolution provider pursuant to the associated Transfer Dispute Resolution Policy. As needed Verisign is available to offer policy guidance as issues arise.

Security and Stability Concerns: Verisign is unaware of any impact, caused by the service, on throughput, response time, consistency, or coherence of the responses to Internet servers or end-user systems. By implementing the IRTP in accordance with ICANN policy, security is enhanced as all transfer commands are authenticated using the AuthInfo code prior to processing.

ICANN Prior Approval: Verisign has been in compliance with the IRTP since November 2004 and is available to support DH in a consulting capacity as needed.

Unique to the TLD: This service is not provided in a manner unique to the .HOME TLD.

2.2 Add Grace Period (AGP) Limits Policy

Technical Component: Verisign’s registry system monitors registrars’ Add grace period deletion activity and provides reporting that permits DH to assess registration fees upon registrars that have exceeded the AGP thresholds stipulated in the AGP Limits Policy. Further, DH accepts and evaluates all exemption requests received from registrars and determines whether the exemption request meets the exemption criteria. DH maintains all AGP Limits Policy exemption request activity so that this material may be included within DH’s Monthly Registry Operator Report to ICANN.

Registrars that exceed the limits established by the policy may submit exemption requests to DH for consideration. DH’s compliance office reviews these exemption requests in accordance with the AGP Limits Policy and renders a decision. Upon request, DH submits associated reporting on exemption request activity to support reporting in accordance with established ICANN requirements.

Business Component: The Add grace period (AGP) is restricted for any gTLD operator that has implemented an AGP. Specifically, for each operator:

* During any given month, an operator may not offer any refund to an ICANN-accredited registrar for any domain names deleted during the AGP that exceed (i) 10% of that registrarʹs net new registrations (calculated as the total number of net adds of one-year through ten-year registrations as defined in the monthly reporting requirement of Operator Agreements) in that month, or (ii) fifty (50) domain names, whichever is greater, unless an exemption has been granted by an operator.

* Upon the documented demonstration of extraordinary circumstances, a registrar may seek from an operator an exemption from such restrictions in a specific month. The registrar must confirm in writing to the operator how, at the time the names were deleted, these extraordinary circumstances were not known, reasonably could not have been known, and were outside the registrarʹs control. Acceptance of any exemption will be at the sole and reasonable discretion of the operator; however ʺextraordinary circumstancesʺ that reoccur regularly for the same registrar will not be deemed extraordinary.

In addition to all other reporting requirements to ICANN, DH identifies each registrar that has sought an exemption, along with a brief description of the type of extraordinary circumstance and the action, approval, or denial that the operator took.

Security and Stability Concerns: Verisign is unaware of any impact, caused by the policy, on throughput, response time, consistency, or coherence of the responses to Internet servers or end-user systems.

ICANN Prior Approval: Verisign, DH’s backend registry services provider, has had experience with this policy since its implementation in April 2009 and is available to support DH in a consulting capacity as needed.

Unique to the TLD: This service is not provided in a manner unique to the .HOME TLD.

2.3 Registry Services Evaluation Policy (RSEP)

Technical Component: Verisign, DH’s selected provider of backend registry services, adheres to all RSEP submission requirements. Verisign has followed the process many times and is fully aware of the submission procedures, the type of documentation required, and the evaluation process that ICANN adheres to.

Business Component: In accordance with ICANN procedures detailed on the ICANN RSEP website (http:⁄⁄www.icann.org⁄en⁄registries⁄rsep⁄), all gTLD registry operators are required to follow this policy when submitting a request for new registry services.

Security and Stability Concerns: As part of the RSEP submission process, Verisign, DH’s backend registry services provider, identifies any potential security and stability concerns in accordance with RSEP stability and security requirements. Verisign never launches services without satisfactory completion of the RSEP process and resulting approval.

ICANN Prior Approval: Not applicable.

Unique to the TLD: gTLD RSEP procedures are not implemented in a manner unique to the .HOME TLD.

3 PRODUCTS OR SERVICES ONLY A REGISTRY OPERATOR IS CAPABLE OF PROVIDING BY REASON OF ITS DESIGNATION AS THE REGISTRY OPERATOR

Verisign, DH’s selected backend registry services provider, has developed a Registry-Registrar Two-Factor Authentication Service that complements traditional registration and resolution registry services. In accordance with direction provided in Question 23, Verisign details below the technical and business components of the service, identifies any potential threat to registry security or stability, and lists previous interactions with ICANN to approve the operation of the service. The Two-Factor Authentication Service is currently operational, supporting multiple registries under ICANN’s purview.

DH is unaware of any competition issue that may require the registry service(s) listed in this response to be referred to the appropriate governmental competition authority or authorities with applicable jurisdiction. ICANN previously approved the service(s), at which time it was determined that either the service(s) raised no competitive concerns or any applicable concerns related to competition were satisfactorily addressed.

3.1 Two-Factor Authentication Service

Technical Component: The Registry-Registrar Two-Factor Authentication Service is designed to improve domain name security and assist registrars in protecting the accounts they manage. As part of the service, dynamic one-time passwords augment the user names and passwords currently used to process update, transfer, and⁄or deletion requests. These one-time passwords enable transaction processing to be based on requests that are validated both by “what users know” (i.e., their user name and password) and “what users have” (i.e., a two-factor authentication credential with a one-time-password).

Registrars can use the one-time-password when communicating directly with Verisign’s Customer Service department as well as when using the registrar portal to make manual updates, transfers, and⁄or deletion transactions. The Two-Factor Authentication Service is an optional service offered to registrars that execute the Registry-Registrar Two-Factor Authentication Service Agreement.

Business Component: There is no charge for the Registry-Registrar Two-Factor Authentication Service. It is enabled only for registrars that wish to take advantage of the added security provided by the service.

Security and Stability Concerns: Verisign is unaware of any impact, caused by the service, on throughput, response time, consistency, or coherence of the responses to Internet servers or end-user systems. The service is intended to enhance domain name security, resulting in increased confidence and trust by registrants.

ICANN Prior Approval: ICANN approved the same Two-Factor Authentication Service for Verisign’s use on .com and .net on 10 July 2009 (RSEP Proposal 2009004) and for .name on 16 February 2011 (RSEP Proposal 2011001).

Unique to the TLD: This service is not provided in a manner unique to the .HOME TLD.

3.2 Other allocation methods

As set forth above, an additional registry service which DH will offer is the use of first come, first serve (at a higher fixed annual fee) to determine string allocation in appropriate circumstances, such as in allocating any premium names. Yet another service which DH may offer, commonly used in the marketplace today, is the use of RFPs (Request for Proposals) and Auctions to determine string allocation in appropriate circumstances. To promote and⁄or market allocation of any such strings, such as premium names, by first come, first serve (at a higher fixed annual fee), by RFP, by auction or otherwise, DH will consider, as another potential service, registration and use of such names by DH prior to allocation by FCFS, RFP or auction (which would allow DH, for example, to provide content at such a string indicating that the string is available for allocation under FCFS, RFP, auction, etc.). Another potential service that DH is considering at this time is the imposition of an annual cost recovery based fee to validate registrars that will be providing domain name registration services in the .HOME TLD.

1 ROBUST PLAN FOR OPERATING A RELIABLE SRS

1.1 High-Level Shared Registration System (SRS) System Description

Verisign, Dot Home LLC’s (“DH”) selected provider of backend registry services, provides and operates a robust and reliable SRS that enables multiple registrars to provide domain name registration services in the top-level domain (TLD). Verisign’s proven reliable SRS serves approximately 915 registrars, and Verisign, as a company, has averaged more than 140 million registration transactions per day. The SRS provides a scalable, fault-tolerant platform for the delivery of gTLDs through the use of a central customer database, a web interface, a standard provisioning protocol (i.e., Extensible Provisioning Protocol, EPP), and a transport protocol (i.e., Secure Sockets Layer, SSL).

The SRS components include:

* Web Interface: Allows customers to access the authoritative database for accounts, contacts, users, authorization groups, product catalog, product subscriptions, and customer notification messages.

* EPP Interface: Provides an interface to the SRS that enables registrars to use EPP to register and manage domains, hosts, and contacts.

* Authentication Provider: A Verisign developed application, specific to the SRS, that authenticates a user based on a login name, password, and the SSL certificate common name and client IP address.

The SRS is designed to be scalable and fault tolerant by incorporating clustering in multiple tiers of the platform. New nodes can be added to a cluster within a single tier to scale a specific tier, and if one node fails within a single tier, the services will still be available. The SRS allows registrars to manage the .HOME gTLD domain names in a single architecture.

To flexibly accommodate the scale of its transaction volumes, as well as new technologies, Verisign employs the following design practices:

* Scale for Growth: Scale to handle current volumes and projected growth.

* Scale for Peaks: Scale to twice base capacity to withstand “registration add attacks” from a compromised registrar system.

* Limit Database CPU Utilization: Limit utilization to no more than 50 percent during peak loads.

* Limit Database Memory Utilization: Each user’s login process that connects to the database allocates a small segment of memory to perform connection overhead, sorting, and data caching. Verisign’s standards mandate that no more than 40 percent of the total available physical memory on the database server will be allocated for these functions.

Verisign’s SRS is built upon a three-tier architecture as illustrated in Figure 24-1 and detailed here:

* Gateway Layer: The first tier, the gateway servers, uses EPP to communicate with registrars. These gateway servers then interact with application servers, which comprise the second tier.

* Application Layer: The application servers contain business logic for managing and maintaining the registry business. The business logic is particular to each TLD’s business rules and requirements. The flexible internal design of the application servers allows Verisign to easily leverage existing business rules to apply to the .HOME gTLD. The application servers store DH’s data in the registry database, which comprises the third and final tier. This simple, industry-standard design has been highly effective with other customers for whom Verisign provides backend registry services.

* Database Layer: The database is the heart of this architecture. It stores all the essential information provisioned from registrars through the gateway servers. Separate servers query the database, extract updated zone and Whois information, validate that information, and distribute it around the clock to Verisign’s worldwide domain name resolution sites.

Figure 24-1: See Dot Home LLC_Q24_shared registration system performance

Scalability and Performance. Verisign, DH’s selected backend registry services provider, implements its scalable SRS on a supportable infrastructure that achieves the availability requirements in Specification 10. Verisign employs the design patterns of simplicity and parallelism in both its software and systems, based on its experience that these factors contribute most significantly to scalability and reliable performance. Going counter to feature-rich development patterns, Verisign intentionally minimizes the number of lines of code between the end user and the data delivered. The result is a network of restorable components that provide rapid, accurate updates. Figure 24-2 depicts EPP traffic flows and local redundancy in Verisign’s SRS provisioning architecture. As detailed in the figure, local redundancy is maintained for each layer as well as each piece of equipment. This built-in redundancy enhances operational performance while enabling the future system scaling necessary to meet additional demand created by this or future registry applications.

Figure 24-2: See attached

Besides improving scalability and reliability, local SRS redundancy enables Verisign to take down individual system components for maintenance and upgrades, with little to no performance impact. With Verisign’s redundant design, Verisign can perform routine maintenance while the remainder of the system remains online and unaffected. For the .HOME gTLD registry, this flexibility minimizes unplanned downtime and provides a more consistent end-user experience.

1.2 Representative Network Diagrams

Figure 24-3 provides a summary network diagram of DH’s selected backend registry services provider’s (Verisign’s) SRS. This configuration at both the primary and alternate-primary Verisign data centers provides a highly reliable backup capability. Data is continuously replicated between both sites to ensure failover to the alternate-primary site can be implemented expeditiously to support both planned and unplanned outages.

Figure 24-3: See attached

1.3 Number of Servers

As DH’s selected provider of backend registry services, Verisign continually reviews its server deployments for all aspects of its registry service. Verisign evaluates usage based on peak performance objectives as well as current transaction volumes, which drive the quantity of servers in its implementations. Verisign’s scaling is based on the following factors:

* Server configuration is based on CPU, memory, disk IO, total disk, and network throughput projections.

* Server quantity is determined through statistical modeling to fulfill overall performance objectives as defined by both the service availability and the server configuration.

* To ensure continuity of operations for the .HOME gTLD, Verisign uses a minimum of 100 dedicated servers per SRS site. These servers are virtualized to meet demand.

1.4 Description of Interconnectivity with Other Registry Systems

Figure 24-4 provides a technical overview of the DH’s selected backend registry services provider’s (Verisign’s) SRS, showing how the SRS component fits into this larger system and interconnects with other system components.

Figure 24-4: See attached

1.5 Frequency of Synchronization Between Servers

As DH’s selected provider of backend registry services, Verisign uses synchronous replication to keep the Verisign SRS continuously in sync between the two data centers. This synchronization is performed in near-real time, thereby supporting rapid failover should a failure occur or a planned maintenance outage be required.

1.6 Synchronization Scheme

Verisign uses synchronous replication to keep the Verisign SRS continuously in sync between the two data centers. Because the alternate-primary site is continuously up, and built using an identical design to the primary data center, it is classified as a “hot standby.”

2 SCALABILITY AND PERFORMANCE ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE OVERALL BUSINESS APPROACH AND PLANNED SIZE OF THE REGISTRY

Verisign is an experienced backend registry provider that has developed and uses proprietary system scaling models to guide the growth of its TLD supporting infrastructure. These models direct Verisign’s infrastructure scaling to include, but not be limited to, server capacity, data storage volume, and network throughput that are aligned to projected demand and usage patterns. Verisign periodically updates these models to account for the adoption of more capable and cost-effective technologies.

Verisign’s scaling models are proven predictors of needed capacity and related cost. As such, they provide the means to link the projected infrastructure needs of the .HOME gTLD with necessary implementation and sustainment cost. Using the projected usage volume for the most likely scenario (defined in Question 46, Template 1 – Financial Projections: Most Likely) as an input to its scaling models, Verisign derived the necessary infrastructure required to implement and sustain this gTLD. Verisign’s pricing for the backend registry services it provides to DH fully accounts for cost related to this infrastructure, which is provided as “Total Critical Registry Function Cash Outflows” (Template 1, Line IIb.G) within the Question 46 financial projections response.

3 TECHNICAL PLAN THAT IS ADEQUATELY RESOURCED IN THE PLANNED COSTS DETAILED IN THE FINANCIAL SECTION

Verisign, the DH’s selected provider of backend registry services, is an experienced backend registry provider that has developed a set of proprietary resourcing models to project the number and type of personnel resources necessary to operate a TLD. Verisign routinely adjusts these staffing models to account for new tools and process innovations. These models enable Verisign to continually right-size its staff to accommodate projected demand and meet service level agreements as well as Internet security and stability requirements. Using the projected usage volume for the most likely scenario (defined in Question 46, Template 1 – Financial Projections: Most Likely) as an input to its staffing models, Verisign derived the necessary personnel levels required for this gTLD’s initial implementation and ongoing maintenance. Verisign’s pricing for the backend registry services provided to DH fully accounts for this personnel-related cost, which is provided as “Total Critical Registry Function Cash Outflows” (Template 1, Line IIb.G) within the Question 46 financial projections response.

Verisign employs more than 1,040 individuals of which more than 775 comprise its technical work force. (Current statistics are publicly available in Verisign’s quarterly filings.) Drawing from this pool of on-hand and fully committed technical resources, Verisign has maintained DNS operational accuracy and stability 100 percent of the time for more than 13 years for .com, proving Verisign’s ability to align personnel resource growth to the scale increases of Verisign’s TLD service offerings.

Verisign projects it will use the following personnel roles, which are described in Section 5 of the response to Question 31, Technical Overview of Proposed Registry, to support SRS performance:

* Application Engineers: 19
* Database Administrators: 8
* Database Engineers: 3
* Network Administrators: 11
* Network Architects: 4
* Project Managers: 25
* Quality Assurance Engineers: 11
* SRS System Administrators: 13
* Storage Administrators: 4
* Systems Architects: 9

To implement and manage the .HOME gTLD as described in this application, Verisign, DH’s selected backend registry services provider, scales, as needed, the size of each technical area now supporting its portfolio of TLDs. Consistent with its resource modeling, Verisign periodically reviews the level of work to be performed and adjusts staff levels for each technical area.

When usage projections indicate a need for additional staff, Verisign’s internal staffing group uses an in-place staffing process to identify qualified candidates. These candidates are then interviewed by the lead of the relevant technical area. By scaling one common team across all its TLDs instead of creating a new entity to manage only this proposed gTLD, Verisign realizes significant economies of scale and ensures its TLD best practices are followed consistently. This consistent application of best practices helps ensure the security and stability of both the Internet and this proposed gTLD, as Verisign holds all contributing staff members accountable to the same procedures that guide its execution of the Internet’s largest TLDs (i.e., .com and .net). Moreover, by augmenting existing teams, Verisign affords new employees the opportunity to be mentored by existing senior staff. This mentoring minimizes start-up learning curves and helps ensure that new staff members properly execute their duties.

4 EVIDENCE OF COMPLIANCE WITH SPECIFICATION 6 AND 10 TO THE REGISTRY AGREEMENT

Section 1.2 (EPP) of Specification 6, Registry Interoperability and Continuity Specifications. Verisign, DH’s selected backend registry services provider, provides these services using its SRS, which complies fully with Specification 6, Section 1.2 of the Registry Agreement. In using its SRS to provide backend registry services, Verisign implements and complies with relevant existing RFCs (i.e., 5730, 5731, 5732, 5733, 5734, and 5910) and intends to comply with RFCs that may be published in the future by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), including successor standards, modifications, or additions thereto relating to the provisioning and management of domain names that use EPP. In addition, Verisign’s SRS includes a Registry Grace Period (RGP) and thus complies with RFC 3915 and its successors. Details of the Verisign SRS’ compliance with RFC SRS⁄EPP are provided in the response to Question 25, Extensible Provisioning Protocol. Verisign does not use functionality outside the base EPP RFCs, although proprietary EPP extensions are documented in Internet-Draft format following the guidelines described in RFC 3735 within the response to Question 25. Moreover, prior to deployment, DH will provide to ICANN updated documentation of all the EPP objects and extensions supported in accordance with Specification 6, Section 1.2.

Specification 10, EPP Registry Performance Specifications. Verisign’s SRS meets all EPP Registry Performance Specifications detailed in Specification 10, Section 2. Evidence of this performance can be verified by a review of the .com and .net Registry Operator’s Monthly Reports, which Verisign files with ICANN. These reports detail Verisign’s operational status of the .com and .net registries, which use an SRS design and approach comparable to the one proposed for the .HOME gTLD. These reports provide evidence of Verisign’s ability to meet registry operation service level agreements (SLAs) comparable to those detailed in Specification 10. The reports are accessible at the following URL: http:⁄⁄www.icann.org⁄en⁄tlds⁄monthly-reports⁄.

In accordance with EPP Registry Performance Specifications detailed in Specification 10, Verisignʹs SRS meets the following performance attributes:

* EPP service availability: 〈 or = 864 minutes of downtime (approx. 98%)

* EPP session-command round trip time (RTT): 〈 or = 4000 milliseconds (ms), for at least 90 percent of the commands

* EPP query-command RTT: 〈 or = 2000 ms, for at least 90 percent of the commands

* EPP transform-command RTT: 〈 or = 4000 ms, for at least 90 percent of the commands

1 COMPLETE KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING OF THIS ASPECT OF REGISTRY TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS

Verisign, Dot Home LLC’s (“DH”) selected backend registry services provider, has used Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) since its inception and possesses complete knowledge and understanding of EPP registry systems. Its first EPP implementation— for a thick registry for the .name generic top-level domain (gTLD)—was in 2002. Since then Verisign has continued its RFC-compliant use of EPP in multiple TLDs, as detailed in Figure 25-1. 

Figure 25-1: See Dot Home LLC_Q25_extensible provisioning protocol_F25-1

Verisign’s understanding of EPP and its ability to implement code that complies with the applicable RFCs is unparalleled. Mr. Scott Hollenbeck, Verisign’s director of software development, authored the Extensible Provisioning Protocol and continues to be fully engaged in its refinement and enhancement (U.S. Patent Number 7299299 – Shared registration system for registering domain names). Verisign has also developed numerous new object mappings and object extensions following the guidelines in RFC 3735 (Guidelines for Extending the Extensible Provisioning Protocol). Mr. James Gould, a principal engineer at Verisign, led and co-authored the most recent EPP Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) RFC effort (RFC 5910).

All registry systems for which Verisign is the registry operator or provides backend registry services use EPP. Upon approval of this application, Verisign will use EPP to provide the backend registry services for this gTLD. The .com, .net, and .name registries for which Verisign is the registry operator use an SRS design and approach comparable to the one proposed for this gTLD. Approximately 915 registrars use the Verisign EPP service, and the registry system performs more than 140 million EPP transactions daily without performance issues or restrictive maintenance windows. The processing time service level agreement (SLA) requirements for the Verisign-operated .net gTLD are the strictest of the current Verisign managed gTLDs. All processing times for Verisign-operated gTLDs can be found in ICANN’s Registry Operator’s Monthly Reports at http:⁄⁄www.icann.org⁄en⁄tlds⁄monthly-reports⁄. 

Verisign has also been active on the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Provisioning Registry Protocol (provreg) working group and mailing list since work started on the EPP protocol in 2000. This working group provided a forum for members of the Internet community to comment on Mr. Scott Hollenbeck’s initial EPP drafts, which Mr. Hollenbeck refined based on input and discussions with representatives from registries, registrars, and other interested parties. The working group has since concluded, but the mailing list is still active to enable discussion of different aspects of EPP.

1.1 EPP Interface with Registrars

Verisign, DH’s selected backend registry services provider,  fully supports the features defined in the EPP specifications and provides a set of software development kits (SDK) and tools to help registrars build secure and stable interfaces. Verisign’s SDKs give registrars the option of either fully writing their own EPP client software to integrate with the Shared Registration System (SRS), or using the Verisign-provided SDKs to aid them in the integration effort. Registrars can download the Verisign EPP SDKs and tools from the registrar website (http:⁄⁄www.Verisign.com⁄domain-name-services⁄current-registrars⁄epp-sdk⁄index.html). 

The EPP SDKs provide a host of features including connection pooling, Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), and a test server (stub server) to run EPP tests against. One tool—the EPP tool—provides a web interface for creating EPP Extensible Markup Language (XML) commands and sending them to a configurable set of target servers. This helps registrars in creating the template XML and testing a variety of test cases against the EPP servers. An Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E) environment, which runs the same software as the production system so approved registrars can integrate and test their software before moving into a live production environment, is also available. 

2 TECHNICAL PLAN SCOPE⁄SCALE CONSISTENT WITH THE OVERALL BUSINESS APPROACH AND PLANNED SIZE OF THE REGISTRY

Verisign, DH’s selected backend registry services provider, is an experienced backend registry provider that has developed and uses proprietary system scaling models to guide the growth of its TLD supporting infrastructure. These models direct Verisign’s infrastructure scaling to include, but not be limited to, server capacity, data storage volume, and network throughput that are aligned to projected demand and usage patterns. Verisign periodically updates these models to account for the adoption of more capable and cost-effective technologies. 

Verisign’s scaling models are proven predictors of needed capacity and related cost. As such, they provide the means to link the projected infrastructure needs of the .HOME gTLD with necessary implementation and sustainment cost. Using the projected usage volume for the most likely scenario (defined in Question 46, Template 1 – Financial Projections: Most Likely) as an input to its scaling models, Verisign derived the necessary infrastructure required to implement and sustain this gTLD. Verisign’s pricing for the backend registry services it provides to DH fully accounts for cost related to this infrastructure, which is provided as  “Total Critical Registry Function Cash Outflows” (Template 1, Line IIb.G) within the Question 46 financial projections response.

3 TECHNICAL PLAN THAT IS ADEQUATELY RESOURCED IN THE PLANNED COSTS DETAILED IN THE FINANCIAL SECTION

Verisign, DH’s selected backend registry services provider, is an experienced backend registry provider that  has developed a set of proprietary resourcing models to project the number and type of personnel resources necessary to operate a TLD. Verisign routinely adjusts these staffing models to account for new tools and process innovations. These models enable Verisign to continually right-size its staff to accommodate projected demand and meet service level agreements as well as Internet security and stability requirements. Using the projected usage volume for the most likely scenario (defined in Question 46, Template 1 – Financial Projections: Most Likely) as an input to its staffing models, Verisign derived the necessary personnel levels required for this gTLD’s initial implementation and ongoing maintenance. Verisign’s pricing for the backend registry services it provides to DH fully accounts for cost related to this infrastructure, which is provided as “Total Critical Registry Function Cash Outflows” (Template 1, Line IIb.G) within the Question 46 financial projections response. 

Verisign employs more than 1,040 individuals of which more than 775 comprise its technical work force. (Current statistics are publicly available in Verisign’s quarterly filings.) Drawing from this pool of on-hand and fully committed technical resources, Verisign has maintained DNS operational accuracy and stability 100 percent of the time for more than 13 years for .com, proving Verisign’s ability to align personnel resource growth to the scale increases of Verisign’s TLD service offerings. 

Verisign projects it will use the following personnel roles, which are described in Section 5 of the response to Question 31, Technical Overview of Proposed Registry, to support the provisioning of EPP services:

* Application Engineers: 19 
* Database Engineers: 3 
* Quality Assurance Engineers: 11 

To implement and manage the .HOME gTLD as described in this application, Verisign, DH’s selected backend registry services provider, scales, as needed, the size of each technical area now supporting its portfolio of TLDs. Consistent with its resource modeling, Verisign periodically reviews the level of work to be performed and adjusts staff levels for each technical area. 

When usage projections indicate a need for additional staff, Verisign’s internal staffing group uses an in-place staffing process to identify qualified candidates. These candidates are then interviewed by the lead of the relevant technical area. By scaling one common team across all its TLDs instead of creating a new entity to manage only this proposed gTLD, Verisign realizes significant economies of scale and ensures its TLD best practices are followed consistently. This consistent application of best practices helps ensure the security and stability of both the Internet and this proposed TLD, as Verisign holds all contributing staff members accountable to the same procedures that guide its execution of the Internet’s largest TLDs (i.e., .com and .net). Moreover, by augmenting existing teams, Verisign affords new employees the opportunity to be mentored by existing senior staff. This mentoring minimizes start-up learning curves and helps ensure that new staff members properly execute their duties.

4 ABILITY TO COMPLY WITH RELEVANT RFCS 

Verisign, DH’s selected backend registry services provider, incorporates design reviews, code reviews, and peer reviews into its software development lifecycle (SDLC) to ensure compliance with the relevant RFCs. Verisign’s dedicated QA team creates extensive test plans and issues internal certifications when it has confirmed the accuracy of the code in relation to the RFC requirements. Verisign’s QA organization is independent from the development team within engineering. This separation helps Verisign ensure adopted processes and procedures are followed, further ensuring that all software releases fully consider the security and stability of the TLD. 

For the .HOME gTLD, the Shared Registration System (SRS) complies with the following IETF EPP specifications, where the XML templates and XML schemas are defined in the following specifications:

* EPP RGP 3915 (http:⁄⁄www.apps.ietf.org⁄rfc⁄rfc3915.html): EPP Redemption Grace Period (RGP) Mapping specification for support of RGP statuses and support of Restore Request and Restore Report (authored by Verisign’s Scott Hollenbeck)

* EPP 5730 (http:⁄⁄tools.ietf.org⁄html⁄rfc5730): Base EPP specification (authored by Verisign’s Scott Hollenbeck)

* EPP Domain 5731 (http:⁄⁄tools.ietf.org⁄html⁄rfc5731): EPP Domain Name Mapping specification (authored by Verisign’s Scott Hollenbeck)

* EPP Host 5732 (http:⁄⁄tools.ietf.org⁄html⁄rfc5732): EPP Host Mapping specification (authored by Verisign’s Scott Hollenbeck)

* EPP Contact 5733 (http:⁄⁄tools.ietf.org⁄html⁄rfc5733): EPP Contact Mapping specification (authored by Verisign’s Scott Hollenbeck)

* EPP TCP 5734 (http:⁄⁄tools.ietf.org⁄html⁄rfc5734): EPP Transport over Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) specification (authored by Verisign’s Scott Hollenbeck)

* EPP DNSSEC 5910 (http:⁄⁄tools.ietf.org⁄html⁄rfc5910): EPP Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) Mapping specification (authored by Verisign’s James Gould and Scott Hollenbeck)

5 PROPRIETARY EPP EXTENSIONS

Verisign, DH’s selected backend registry services provider, uses its SRS to provide registry services. The SRS supports the following EPP specifications, which Verisign developed following the guidelines in RFC 3735, where the XML templates and XML schemas are defined in the specifications:

* IDN Language Tag (http:⁄⁄www.verisigninc.com⁄assets⁄idn-language-tag.pdf): EPP internationalized domain names (IDN) language tag extension used for IDN domain name registrations

* RGP Poll Mapping (http:⁄⁄www.verisigninc.com⁄assets⁄whois-info-extension.pdf): EPP mapping for an EPP poll message in support of Restore Request and Restore Report

* Whois Info Extension (http:⁄⁄www.verisigninc.com⁄assets⁄whois-info-extension.pdf): EPP extension for returning additional information needed for transfers

* EPP ConsoliDate Mapping (http:⁄⁄www.verisigninc.com⁄assets⁄consolidate-mapping.txt): EPP mapping to support a Domain Sync operation for synchronizing domain name expiration dates

* NameStore Extension (http:⁄⁄www.verisigninc.com⁄assets⁄namestore-extension.pdf): EPP extension for routing with an EPP intelligent gateway to a pluggable set of backend products and services

* Low Balance Mapping (http:⁄⁄www.verisigninc.com⁄assets⁄low-balance-mapping.pdf): EPP mapping to support low balance poll messages that proactively notify registrars of a low balance (available credit) condition

As part of the 2006 implementation report to bring the EPP RFC documents from Proposed Standard status to Draft Standard status, an implementation test matrix was completed. Two independently developed EPP client implementations based on the RFCs were tested against the Verisign EPP server for the domain, host, and contact transactions. No compliance-related issues were identified during this test, providing evidence that these extensions comply with RFC 3735 guidelines and further demonstrating Verisign’s ability to design, test, and deploy an RFC-compliant EPP implementation.

5.1 EPP Templates and Schemas

The EPP XML schemas are formal descriptions of the EPP XML templates. They are used to express the set of rules to which the EPP templates must conform in order to be considered valid by the schema. The EPP schemas define the building blocks of the EPP templates, describing the format of the data and the different EPP commands’ request and response formats. The current EPP implementations managed by Verisign, DH’s selected backend registry services provider, use these EPP templates and schemas, as will the proposed TLD. For each proprietary XML template⁄schema Verisign provides a reference to the applicable template and includes the schema.

XML templates⁄schema for idnLang-1.0: See Dot Home LLC_Q25_extensible provisioning protocol_xml

XML templates⁄schema for rgp-poll-1.0: See Dot Home LLC_Q25_extensible provisioning protocol_xml

XML templates⁄schema for whoisInf-1.0: See Dot Home LLC_Q25_extensible provisioning protocol_xml

XML templates⁄schema for sync-1.0 (consoliDate): See Dot Home LLC_Q25_extensible provisioning protocol_xml

XML templates⁄schema for namestoreExt-1.1: See Dot Home LLC_Q25_extensible provisioning protocol_xml

XML templates⁄schema for lowbalance-poll-1.0: See Dot Home LLC_Q25_extensible provisioning protocol_xml

6 PROPRIETARY EPP EXTENSION CONSISTENCY WITH REGISTRATION LIFECYCLE 

DH’s selected backend registry services provider’s (Verisign’s) proprietary EPP extensions, defined in Section 5 above, are consistent with the registration lifecycle documented in the response to Question 27, Registration Lifecycle.  Details of the registration lifecycle are presented in that response. As new registry features are required, Verisign develops proprietary EPP extensions to address new operational requirements. Consistent with ICANN procedures Verisign adheres to all applicable Registry Services Evaluation Process (RSEP) procedures.

1 COMPLETE KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING OF THIS ASPECT OF REGISTRY TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS

Verisign, Dot Home LLC’s (“DH”) selected backend registry services provider, has operated the Whois lookup service for the gTLDs and ccTLDs it manages since 1991, and will provide these proven services for the .HOME gTLD registry. In addition, it continues to work with the Internet community to improve the utility of Whois data, while thwarting its application for abusive uses.

1.1 High-Level Whois System Description

Like all other components of DH’s selected backend registry services provider’s (Verisign’s) registry service, Verisign’s Whois system is designed and built for both reliability and performance in full compliance with applicable RFCs. Verisign’s current Whois implementation has answered more than five billion Whois queries per month for the TLDs it manages, and has experienced more than 250,000 queries per minute in peak conditions. The proposed gTLD uses a Whois system design and approach that is comparable to the current implementation. Independent quality control testing ensures Verisign’s Whois service is RFC-compliant through all phases of its lifecycle.

Verisignʹs redundant Whois databases further contribute to overall system availability and reliability. The hardware and software for its Whois service is architected to scale both horizontally (by adding more servers) and vertically (by adding more CPUs and memory to existing servers) to meet future need.

Verisign can fine-tune access to its Whois database on an individual Internet Protocol (IP) address basis, and it works with registrars to help ensure their services are not limited by any restriction placed on Whois. Verisign provides near real-time updates for Whois services for the TLDs under its management. As information is updated in the registration database, it is propagated to the Whois servers for quick publication. These updates align with the near real-time publication of Domain Name System (DNS) information as it is updated in the registration database. This capability is important for the .HOME gTLD registry as it is Verisign’s experience that when DNS data is updated in near real time, so should Whois data be updated to reflect the registration specifics of those domain names.

Verisign’s Whois response time has been less than 500 milliseconds for 95 percent of all Whois queries in .com, .net, .tv, and .cc. The response time in these TLDs, combined with Verisign’s capacity, enables the Whois system to respond to up to 30,000 searches (or queries) per second for a total capacity of 2.6 billion queries per day.

The Whois software written by Verisign complies with RFC 3912. Verisign uses an advanced in-memory database technology to provide exceptional overall system performance and security. In accordance with RFC 3912, Verisign provides a website at whois.nic.〈TLD〉 that provides free public query-based access to the registration data.

Verisign currently operates both thin and thick Whois systems.

Verisign commits to implementing a RESTful Whois service upon finalization of agreements with the IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force).

Provided Functionalities for User Interface

To use the Whois service via port 43, the user enters the applicable parameter on the command line as illustrated here:

* For domain name: whois EXAMPLE.TLD
* For registrar: whois ʺregistrar Example Registrar, Inc.ʺ
* For name server: whois ʺNS1.EXAMPLE.TLDʺ or whois ʺname server (IP address)ʺ

To use the Whois service via the web-based directory service search interface:

* Go to http:⁄⁄whois.nic.〈TLD〉
* Click on the appropriate button (Domain, Registrar, or Name Server)
* Enter the applicable parameter:
o Domain name, including the TLD (e.g., EXAMPLE.TLD)
o Full name of the registrar, including punctuation (e.g., Example Registrar, Inc.)
o Full host name or the IP address (e.g., NS1.EXAMPLE.TLD or 198.41.3.39)
* Click on the Submit button.

Provisions to Ensure That Access Is Limited to Legitimate Authorized Users and Is in Compliance with Applicable Privacy Laws or Policies

To further promote reliable and secure Whois operations, Verisign, DH’s selected backend registry services provider, has implemented rate-limiting characteristics within the Whois service software. For example, to prevent data mining or other abusive behavior, the service can throttle a specific requestor if the query rate exceeds a configurable threshold. In addition, QoS technology enables rate limiting of queries before they reach the servers, which helps protect against denial of service (DoS) and distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks.

Verisign’s software also permits restrictions on search capabilities. For example, wild card searches can be disabled. If needed, it is possible to temporarily restrict and⁄or block requests coming from specific IP addresses for a configurable amount of time. Additional features that are configurable in the Whois software include help files, headers and footers for Whois query responses, statistics, and methods to memory map the database. Furthermore, Verisign is European Union (EU) Safe Harbor certified and has worked with European data protection authorities to address applicable privacy laws by developing a tiered Whois access structure that requires users who require access to more extensive data to (i) identify themselves, (ii) confirm that their use is for a specified purpose and (iii) enter into an agreement governing their use of the more extensive Whois data.

1.2 Relevant Network Diagrams

Figure 26-1 provides a summary network diagram of the Whois service provided by Verisign, DH’s selected backend registry services provider. The figure details the configuration with one resolution⁄Whois site. For the .HOME gTLD Verisign provides Whois service from 6 of its 17 primary sites based on the proposed gTLD’s traffic volume and patterns. A functionally equivalent resolution architecture configuration exists at each Whois site.

Figure 26-1: See Dot Home LLC_Q26_whois

1.3 IT and Infrastructure Resources

Figure 26-2 summarizes the IT and infrastructure resources that Verisign, DH’s selected backend registry services provider, uses to provision Whois services from Verisign primary resolution sites. As needed, virtual machines are created based on actual and projected demand.

Figure 26-2: See attached

1.4 Description of Interconnectivity with Other Registry Systems

Figure 26-3 provides a technical overview of the registry system provided by Verisign, DH’s selected backend registry services provider, and shows how the Whois service component fits into this larger system and interconnects with other system components.

Figure 26-3: See attached

1.5 Frequency of Synchronization Between Servers

Synchronization between the SRS and the geographically distributed Whois resolution sites occurs approximately every three minutes. Verisign, DH’s selected backend registry services provider, uses a two-part Whois update process to ensure Whois data is accurate and available. Every 12 hours an initial file is distributed to each resolution site. This file is a complete copy of all Whois data fields associated with each domain name under management. As interactions with the SRS cause the Whois data to be changed, these incremental changes are distributed to the resolution sites as an incremental file update. This incremental update occurs approximately every three minutes. When the new 12-hour full update is distributed, this file includes all past incremental updates. Verisign’s approach to frequency of synchronization between servers meets the Performance Specifications defined in Specification 10 of the Registry Agreement for new gTLDs.

2 TECHNICAL PLAN SCOPE⁄SCALE CONSISTENT WITH THE OVERALL BUSINESS APPROACH AND PLANNED SIZE OF THE REGISTRY

Verisign, DH’s selected backend registry services provider, is an experienced backend registry provider that has developed and uses proprietary system scaling models to guide the growth of its TLD supporting infrastructure. These models direct Verisign’s infrastructure scaling to include, but not be limited to, server capacity, data storage volume, and network throughput that are aligned to projected demand and usage patterns. Verisign periodically updates these models to account for the adoption of more capable and cost-effective technologies.

3 TECHNICAL PLAN THAT IS ADEQUATELY RESOURCED IN THE PLANNED COSTS DETAILED IN THE FINANCIAL SECTION

Verisign, DH’s selected backend registry services provider, is an experienced backend registry provider that has developed a set of proprietary resourcing models to project the number and type of personnel resources necessary to operate a TLD. Verisign routinely adjusts these staffing models to account for new tools and process innovations. These models enable Verisign to continually right-size its staff to accommodate projected demand and meet service level agreements as well as Internet security and stability requirements. Using the projected usage volume for the most likely scenario (defined in Question 46, Template 1 – Financial Projections: Most Likely) as an input to its staffing models, Verisign derived the necessary personnel levels required for this gTLD’s initial implementation and ongoing maintenance. Verisign’s pricing for the backend registry services it provides to DH fully accounts for cost related to this infrastructure, which is provided as “Total Critical Registry Function Cash Outflows” (Template 1, Line IIb.G) within the Question 46 financial projections response.

Verisign projects it will use the following personnel roles, which are described in Section 5 of the response to Question 31, Technical Overview of Proposed Registry, to support Whois services:

* Application Engineers: 19
* Database Engineers: 3
* Quality Assurance Engineers: 11

4 COMPLIANCE WITH RELEVANT RFC

DH’s selected backend registry services provider’s (Verisign’s) Whois service complies with the data formats defined in Specification 4 of the Registry Agreement. Verisign will provision Whois services for registered domain names and associated data in the top-level domain (TLD). Verisign’s Whois services are accessible over Internet Protocol version 4 (IPv4) and Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6), via both Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) port 43 and a web-based directory service at whois.nic.〈TLD〉, which in accordance with RFC 3912, provides free public query-based access to domain name, registrar, and name server lookups. Verisign’s proposed Whois system meets all requirements as defined by ICANN for each registry under Verisign management. Evidence of this successful implementation, and thus compliance with the applicable RFCs, can be verified by a review of the .com and .net Registry Operator’s Monthly Reports that Verisign files with ICANN. These reports provide evidence of Verisign’s ability to meet registry operation service level agreements (SLAs) comparable to those detailed in Specification 10. The reports are accessible at the following URL: http:⁄⁄www.icann.org⁄en⁄tlds⁄monthly-reports⁄.

5 COMPLIANCE WITH SPECIFICATIONS 4 AND 10 OF REGISTRY AGREEMENT

In accordance with Specification 4, Verisign, DH’s selected backend registry services provider, provides a Whois service that is available via both port 43 in accordance with RFC 3912, and a web-based directory service at whois.nic.〈TLD〉 also in accordance with RFC 3912, thereby providing free public query-based access. Verisign acknowledges that ICANN reserves the right to specify alternative formats and protocols, and upon such specification, Verisign will implement such alternative specification as soon as reasonably practicable.

The format of the following data fields conforms to the mappings specified in Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) RFCs 5730 – 5734 so the display of this information (or values returned in Whois responses) can be uniformly processed and understood: domain name status, individual and organizational names, address, street, city, state⁄province, postal code, country, telephone and fax numbers, email addresses, date, and times.

Specifications for data objects, bulk access, and lookups comply with Specification 4 and are detailed in the following subsections, provided in both bulk access and lookup modes.

Bulk Access Mode. This data is provided on a daily schedule to a party designated from time to time in writing by ICANN. The specification of the content and format of this data, and the procedures for providing access, shall be as stated below, until revised in the ICANN Registry Agreement.

The data is provided in three files:

* Domain Name File: For each domain name, the file provides the domain name, server name for each name server, registrar ID, and updated date.

* Name Server File: For each registered name server, the file provides the server name, each IP address, registrar ID, and updated date.

* Registrar File: For each registrar, the following data elements are provided: registrar ID, registrar address, registrar telephone number, registrar email address, Whois server, referral URL, updated date, and the name, telephone number, and email address of all the registrarʹs administrative, billing, and technical contacts.

Lookup Mode. Figures 26-4 through Figure 26-6 provide the query and response format for domain name, registrar, and name server data objects.

Figure 26-4: See attached

Figure 26-5: See attached

Figure 26-6: See attached

5.1 Specification 10, RDDS Registry Performance Specifications

The Whois service meets all registration data directory services (RDDS) registry performance specifications detailed in Specification 10, Section 2. Evidence of this performance can be verified by a review of the .com and .net Registry Operator’s Monthly Reports that Verisign files monthly with ICANN. These reports are accessible from the ICANN website at the following URL: http:⁄⁄www.icann.org⁄en⁄tlds⁄monthly-reports⁄.

In accordance with RDDS registry performance specifications detailed in Specification 10, Verisignʹs Whois service meets the following proven performance attributes:

* RDDS availability: 〈 or = 864 min of downtime (approx. 98%)
* RDDS query RTT: 〈 or = 2000 ms, for at least 95% of the queries
* RDDS update time: 〈 or = 60 min, for at least 95% of the probes

6 SEARCHABLE WHOIS

Verisign, DH’s selected backend registry services provider, provides a searchable Whois service for the .HOME gTLD. Verisign has experience in providing tiered access to Whois for the .name registry, and uses these methods and control structures to help reduce potential malicious use of the function. The searchable Whois system currently uses Apache’s Lucene full text search engine to index relevant Whois content with near-real time incremental updates from the provisioning system.

Features of the Verisign searchable Whois function include:

* Provision of a web-based searchable directory service

* Ability to perform partial match, at least, for the following data fields: domain name, contacts and registrant’s name, and contact and registrant’s postal address, including all the sub-fields described in EPP (e.g., street, city, state, or province)

* Ability to perform exact match, at least, on the following fields: registrar ID, name server name, and name server’s IP address (only applies to IP addresses stored by the registry, i.e., glue records)

* Ability to perform Boolean search supporting, at least, the following logical operators to join a set of search criteria: AND, OR, NOT

* Search results that include domain names that match the selected search criteria

Verisign’s implementation of searchable Whois is EU Safe Harbor certified and includes appropriate access control measures that help ensure that only legitimate authorized users can use the service. Furthermore, Verisign’s compliance office monitors current ICANN policy and applicable privacy laws or policies to help ensure the solution is maintained within compliance of applicable regulations. Features of these access control measures include:

* All unauthenticated searches are returned as thin results.

* Registry system authentication is used to grant access to appropriate users for thick Whois data search results.

* Account access is granted by DH’s defined .HOME gTLD admin user.

Potential Forms of Abuse and Related Risk Mitigation. Leveraging its experience providing tiered access to Whois for the .name registry and interacting with ICANN, data protection authorities, and applicable industry groups, Verisign, DH’s selected backend registry services provider, is knowledgeable of the likely data mining forms of abuse associated with a searchable Whois service. Figure 26-7 summarizes these potential forms of abuse and Verisign’s approach to mitigate the identified risk.

Figure 26-7: See attached

1 COMPLETE KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING OF REGISTRATION LIFECYCLES AND STATES

Starting with domain name registration and continuing through domain name delete operations, Dot Home LLC’s (“DH”) selected backend registry services provider’s (Verisign’s) registry implements the full registration lifecycle for domain names supporting the operations in the Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) specification. The registration lifecycle of the domain name starts with registration and traverses various states as specified in the following sections. The registry system provides options to update domain names with different server and client status codes that block operations based on the EPP specification. The system also provides different grace periods for different billable operations, where the price of the billable operation is credited back to the registrar if the billable operation is removed within the grace period. Together Figure 27-1 and Figure 27-2 define the registration states comprising the registration lifecycle and explain the trigger points that cause state-to-state transitions. States are represented as green rectangles within Figure 27-1.

Figure 27-1: See Dot Home LLC_Q27_registration lifecycle

Figure 27-2: See attached

1.1 Registration Lifecycle of Create⁄Update⁄Delete

The following section details the create⁄update⁄delete processes and the related renewal process that Verisign, DH’s selected backend registry services provider, follows. For each process, this response defines the process function and its characterization, and as appropriate provides a process flow chart.

Create Process. The domain name lifecycle begins with a registration or what is referred to as a Domain Name Create operation in EPP. The system fully supports the EPP Domain Name Mapping as defined by RFC 5731, where the associated objects (e.g., hosts and contacts) are created independent of the domain name.

Process Characterization. The Domain Name Create command is received, validated, run through a set of business rules, persisted to the database, and committed in the database if all business rules pass. The domain name is included with the data flow to the DNS and Whois resolution services. If no name servers are supplied, the domain name is not included with the data flow to the DNS. A successfully created domain name has the created date and expiration date set in the database. Creates are subject to grace periods as described in Section 1.3 of this response, Add Grace Period, Redemption Grace Period, and Notice Periods for Renewals or Transfers.

The Domain Name Create operation is detailed in Figure 27-3 and requires the following attributes:

* A domain name that meets the string restrictions.

* A domain name that does not already exist.

* The registrar is authorized to create a domain name in .HOME.

* The registrar has available credit.

* A valid Authorization Information (Auth-Info) value.

* Required contacts (e.g., registrant, administrative contact, technical contact, and billing contact) are specified and exist.

* The specified name servers (hosts) exist, and there is a maximum of 13 name servers.

* A period in units of years with a maximum value of 10 (default period is one year).

Figure 27-3: See attached

Renewal Process. The domain name can be renewed unless it has any form of Pending Delete, Pending Transfer, or Renew Prohibited.

A request for renewal that sets the expiry date to more than ten years in the future is denied. The registrar must pass the current expiration date (without the timestamp) to support the idempotent features of EPP, where sending the same command a second time does not cause unexpected side effects.

Automatic renewal occurs when a domain name expires. On the expiration date, the registry extends the registration period one year and debits the registrar account balance. In the case of an auto-renewal of the domain name, a separate Auto-Renew grace period applies. Renewals are subject to grace periods as described in Section 1.3 of this response, Add Grace Period, Redemption Grace Period, and Notice Periods for Renewals or Transfers.

Process Characterization. The Domain Name Renew command is received, validated, authorized, and run through a set of business rules. The data is updated and committed in the database if it passes all business rules. The updated domain name’s expiration date is included in the flow to the Whois resolution service.

The Domain Name Renew operation is detailed in Figure 27-4 and requires the following attributes:

* A domain name that exists and is sponsored by the requesting registrar.
* The registrar is authorized to renew a domain name in .HOME.
* The registrar has available credit.
* The passed current expiration date matches the domain name’s expiration date.
* A period in units of years with a maximum value of 10 (default period is one year). A domain name expiry past ten years is not allowed.

Figure 27-4: See attached

Registrar Transfer Procedures. A registrant may transfer his⁄her domain name from his⁄her current registrar to another registrar. The database system allows a transfer as long as the transfer is not within the initial 60 days, per industry standard, of the original registration date.

The registrar transfer process goes through many process states, which are described in detail below, unless it has any form of Pending Delete, Pending Transfer, or Transfer Prohibited.

A transfer can only be initiated when the appropriate Auth-Info is supplied. The Auth-Info for transfer is only available to the current registrar. Any other registrar requesting to initiate a transfer on behalf of a registrant must obtain the Auth-Info from the registrant.

The Auth-Info is made available to the registrant upon request. The registrant is the only party other than the current registrar that has access to the Auth-Info. Registrar transfer entails a specified extension of the expiry date for the object. The registrar transfer is a billable operation and is charged identically to a renewal for the same extension of the period. This period can be from one to ten years, in one-year increments.

Because registrar transfer involves an extension of the registration period, the rules and policies applying to how the resulting expiry date is set after transfer are based on the renewal policies on extension.

Per industry standard, a domain name cannot be transferred to another registrar within the first 60 days after registration. This restriction continues to apply if the domain name is renewed during the first 60 days. Transfer of the domain name changes the sponsoring registrar of the domain name, and also changes the child hosts (ns1.sample.xyz) of the domain name (sample .xyz).

The domain name transfer consists of five separate operations:

* Transfer Request (Figure 27-5): Executed by a non-sponsoring registrar with the valid Auth-Info provided by the registrant. The Transfer Request holds funds of the requesting registrar but does not bill the registrar until the transfer is completed. The sponsoring registrar receives a Transfer Request poll message.

* Transfer Cancel (Figure 27-6): Executed by the requesting registrar to cancel the pending transfer. The held funds of the requesting registrar are reversed. The sponsoring registrar receives a Transfer Cancel poll message.

* Transfer Approve (Figure 27-7): Executed by the sponsoring registrar to approve the Transfer Request. The requesting registrar is billed for the Transfer Request and the sponsoring registrar is credited for an applicable Auto-Renew grace period. The requesting registrar receives a Transfer Approve poll message.

* Transfer Reject (Figure 27-8): Executed by the sponsoring registrar to reject the pending transfer. The held funds of the requesting registrar are reversed. The requesting registrar receives a Transfer Reject poll message.

* Transfer Query (Figure 27-9): Executed by either the requesting registrar or the sponsoring registrar of the last transfer.

The registry auto-approves a transfer if the sponsoring registrar takes no action. The requesting registrar is billed for the Transfer Request and the sponsoring registrar is credited for an applicable Auto-Renew grace period. The requesting registrar and the sponsoring registrar receive a Transfer Auto-Approve poll message.

Figure 27-5: See attached

Figure 27-6: See attached

Figure 27-7: See attached

Figure 27-8: See attached

Figure 27-9: See attached

Delete Process. A registrar may choose to delete the domain name at any time.

Process Characterization. The domain name can be deleted, unless it has any form of Pending Delete, Pending Transfer, or Delete Prohibited.

A domain name is also prohibited from deletion if it has any in-zone child hosts that are name servers for domain names. For example, the domain name “sample.xyz” cannot be deleted if an in-zone host “ns.sample.xyz” exists and is a name server for “sample2.xyz.”

If the Domain Name Delete occurs within the Add grace period, the domain name is immediately deleted and the sponsoring registrar is credited for the Domain Name Create. If the Domain Name Delete occurs outside the Add grace period, it follows the Redemption grace period (RGP) lifecycle.

Update Process. The sponsoring registrar can update the following attributes of a domain name:

* Auth-Info
* Name servers
* Contacts (i.e., registrant, administrative contact, technical contact, and billing contact)
* Statuses (e.g., Client Delete Prohibited, Client Hold, Client Renew Prohibited, Client Transfer Prohibited, Client Update Prohibited)

Process Characterization. Updates are allowed provided that the update includes the removal of any Update Prohibited status. The Domain Name Update operation is detailed in Figure 27-10.

A domain name can be updated unless it has any form of Pending Delete, Pending Transfer, or Update Prohibited.

Figure 27-10: See attached

1.2 Pending, Locked, Expired, and Transferred

Verisign, DH’s selected backend registry services provider, handles pending, locked, expired, and transferred domain names as described here. When the domain name is deleted after the five-day Add grace period, it enters into the Pending Delete state. The registrant can return its domain name to active any time within the five-day Pending Delete grace period. After the five-day Pending Delete grace period expires, the domain name enters the Redemption Pending state and then is deleted by the system. The registrant can restore the domain name at any time during the Redemption Pending state.

When a non-sponsoring registrar initiates the domain name transfer request, the domain name enters Pending Transfer state and a notification is mailed to the sponsoring registrar for approvals. If the sponsoring registrar doesn’t respond within five days, the Pending Transfer expires and the transfer request is automatically approved.

EPP specifies both client (registrar) and server (registry) status codes that can be used to prevent registry changes that are not intended by the registrant. Currently, many registrars use the client status codes to protect against inadvertent modifications that would affect their customers’ high-profile or valuable domain names.

Verisign’s registry service supports the following client (registrar) and server (registry) status codes:

* clientHold
* clientRenewProhibited
* clientTransferProhibited
* clientUpdateProhibited
* clientDeleteProhibited
* serverHold
* serverRenewProhibited
* serverTransferProhibited
* serverUpdateProhibited
* serverDeleteProhibited

1.3 Add Grace Period, Redemption Grace Period, and Notice Periods for Renewals or Transfers

Verisign, DH’s selected backend registry services provider, handles Add grace periods, Redemption grace periods, and notice periods for renewals or transfers as described here.

* Add Grace Period: The Add grace period is a specified number of days following the initial registration of the domain name. The current value of the Add grace period for all registrars is five days.

* Redemption Grace Period: If the domain name is deleted after the five-day grace period expires, it enters the Redemption grace period and then is deleted by the system. The registrant has an option to use the Restore Request command to restore the domain name within the Redemption grace period. In this scenario, the domain name goes to Pending Restore state if there is a Restore Request command within 30 days of the Redemption grace period. From the Pending Restore state, it goes either to the OK state, if there is a Restore Report Submission command within seven days of the Restore Request grace period, or a Redemption Period state if there is no Restore Report Submission command within seven days of the Restore Request grace period.

* Renew Grace Period: The Renew⁄Extend grace period is a specified number of days following the renewal⁄extension of the domain name’s registration period. The current value of the Renew⁄Extend grace period is five days.

* Auto-Renew Grace Period: All auto-renewed domain names have a grace period of 45 days.

* Transfer Grace Period: Domain names have a five-day Transfer grace period.

1.4 Aspects of the Registration Lifecycle Not Covered by Standard EPP RFCs

DH’s selected backend registry services provider’s (Verisign’s) registration lifecycle processes and code implementations adhere to the standard EPP RFCs related to the registration lifecycle. By adhering to the RFCs, Verisign’s registration lifecycle is complete and addresses each registration-related task comprising the lifecycle. No aspect of Verisign’s registration lifecycle is not covered by one of the standard EPP RFCs and thus no additional definitions are provided in this response.

2 CONSISTENCY WITH ANY SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS MADE TO REGISTRANTS AS ADAPTED TO THE OVERALL BUSINESS APPROACH FOR THE PROPOSED gTLD

The registration lifecycle described above applies to the .HOME gTLD as well as other TLDs managed by Verisign, DH’s selected backend registry services provider; thus Verisign remains consistent with commitments made to its registrants. No unique or specific registration lifecycle modifications or adaptations are required to support the overall business approach for the .HOME gTLD.

To accommodate a range of registries, Verisign’s registry implementation is capable of offering both a thin and thick Whois implementation, which is also built upon Verisign’s award-winning ATLAS infrastructure.

3 COMPLIANCE WITH RELEVANT RFCs

DH’s selected backend registry services provider’s (Verisign’s) registration lifecycle complies with applicable RFCs, specifically RFCs 5730 – 5734 and 3915. The system fully supports the EPP Domain Name Mapping as defined by RFC 5731, where the associated objects (e.g., hosts and contacts) are created independent of the domain name.

In addition, in accordance with RFCs 5732 and 5733, the Verisign registration system enforces the following domain name registration constraints:

* Uniqueness⁄Multiplicity: A second-level domain name is unique in the .HOME database. Two identical second-level domain names cannot simultaneously exist in .HOME. Further, a second-level domain name cannot be created if it conflicts with a reserved domain name.

* Point of Contact Associations: The domain name is associated with the following points of contact. Contacts are created and managed independently according to RFC 5733.

* Registrant
* Administrative contact
* Technical contact
* Billing contact

* Domain Name Associations: Each domain name is associated with:

* A maximum of 13 hosts, which are created and managed independently according to RFC 5732
* An Auth-Info, which is used to authorize certain operations on the object
* Status(es), which are used to describe the domain name’s status in the registry
* A created date, updated date, and expiry date

4 DEMONSTRATES THAT TECHNICAL RESOURCES REQUIRED TO CARRY THROUGH THE PLANS FOR THIS ELEMENT ARE ALREADY ON HAND OR READILY AVAILABLE

Verisign projects it will use the following personnel roles, which are described in Section 5 of the response to Question 31, Technical Overview of Proposed Registry, to support the registration lifecycle:

* Application Engineers: 19
* Customer Support Personnel: 36
* Database Administrators: 8
* Database Engineers: 3
* Quality Assurance Engineers: 11
* SRS System Administrators: 13

1. COMPREHENSIVE ABUSE POLICIES, WHICH INCLUDE CLEAR DEFINITIONS OF WHAT CONSTITUTES ABUSE IN THE TLD, AND PROCEDURES THAT WILL EFFECTIVELY MINIMIZE POTENTIAL FOR ABUSE IN THE TLD

The .HOME gTLD will have a comprehensive abuse policy, which includes a clear definition of what constitutes abuse in .HOME, and procedures in place to effectively minimize potential for abuse in .HOME.  It is a core goal of .HOME to provide a namespace that minimizes harm to Internet users (such as identity theft, harm to children and a general erosion of trust), while not negatively impacting Internet stability or security.  Dot Home LLC (DH) takes abuse prevention and mitigation seriously, and the following core elements of the plan (what constitutes abuse, what we will do if we find abuse, how we can be made aware of abuse, and the processes and procedures we will invoke) shows DH’s commitment to abuse prevention and mitigation in .HOME.

1.1 .HOME Abuse Prevention and Mitigation Implementation Plan 

DH takes abuse prevention and mitigation seriously. The attached .HOME Abuse Prevention and Mitigation plan (the “Plan”) will be published on .HOME’s registry website and details many of .HOME’s policies and procedures regarding abuse prevention and mitigation.  The goal of the Plan is to address significant potential harm to Internet users, including identity theft, harm to children and erosion of trust by Internet users, and to address those who abuse the DNS and otherwise engage in illegal or fraudulent activity via the .HOME gTLD. 

The Plan includes a single abuse point of contact responsible for addressing matters requiring expedited attention and providing a timely response to abuse complaints concerning all .HOME names registered through all registrars of record, including those involving a reseller.  The Plan identifies an Abuse Prevention Manager who will be tasked with being the primary point of contact for receiving all abuse complaints.  

The Plan also includes a clear definition of what constitutes “abuse.”  Particularly, “abuse” or “abusive use” of a .HOME domain name is the wrongful or excessive use of power, position or ability with regard to a .HOME domain, and includes, without limitation, the following:

* Illegal or fraudulent actions;

* Spam: The use of electronic messaging systems to send unsolicited bulk messages. The term applies to e-mail spam and similar abuses such as instant messaging spam, mobile messaging spam, and the spamming of Web sites and Internet forums. An example, for purposes of illustration, would be the use of email in denial-of-service attacks;

* Phishing: The use of counterfeit Web pages that are designed to trick recipients into divulging sensitive data such as usernames, passwords, or financial data;

* Pharming: The redirecting of unknowing users to fraudulent sites or services, typically through DNS hijacking or poisoning;

* Willful distribution of malware: The dissemination of software designed to infiltrate or damage a computer system without the ownerʹs informed consent.
Examples include, without limitation, computer viruses, worms, keyloggers, and trojan horses;

* Botnet command and control: Services run on a domain name that are used to control a collection of compromised computers or ʺzombies,ʺ or to direct denial-of-service attacks (DDoS attacks);

* Distribution of child pornography; and

* Illegal Access to Other Computers or Networks: Illegally accessing computers, accounts, or networks belonging to another party, or attempting to penetrate security measures of another individualʹs system (often known as ʺhackingʺ). Also, any activity that might be used as a precursor to an attempted system penetration (e.g., port scan, stealth scan, or other information gathering activity).

“Abuse” or “abusive use” of a .HOME domain name also includes violation or breach of any policies or rules regarding registration and⁄or use of the .HOME gTLD as set forth by the National Association of Realtors® (NAR). This allows NAR, as steward of the .HOME gTLD, to adopt, address, evolve and enforce current and additional policies in place to prevent or mitigate any abusive use of the .HOME gTLD.

The Plan also includes reservation of the right on DH’s part to deny, cancel or transfer any registration or transaction, or place any domain name(s) on registry lock, hold or similar status, that DH deems necessary: (1) to protect the integrity and stability of .HOME; (2) to comply with any applicable laws, government rules or requirements, requests of law enforcement, or any dispute resolution process; (3) to avoid any liability, civil or criminal, on DH’s and NAR’s part, as well as affiliates, subsidiaries, officers, directors, and employees; (4) per the terms of the registration agreement or (5) to correct mistakes made by DH, NAR or any registrar in connection with a domain name registration. DH also reserves the right to place upon registry lock, hold or similar status a domain name during resolution of a complaint.

DH acknowledges that it is not capable of making final determinations of matters which are appropriately determined in other fora, such as determination of guilt on a criminal matter, determination of child pornography, or determination of other illegality.  As such, with regard to any abuse claim made under color or rule of law, statute or code of any jurisdiction, DH will most likely defer final determination on any such claim to an appropriate tribunal in an appropriate jurisdiction. However, as set forth above, DH also reserves the right to lock, suspend, place on hold (or similar status) any domain which is the subject of an abuse claim while the substance of the claim is pending adjudication or otherwise final determination by the appropriate tribunal in the appropriate jurisdiction.

The Plan also includes procedures that will effectively minimize potential for abuse in the .HOME gTLD, as set forth more completely in Section 1.2 below. 

The Plan is aimed at illegal and abusive use of domains, and is not intended as a substitute, replacement, circumvention or alternative venue for complaints, matters and issues more appropriately addressed by trademark rights protection mechanisms set forth in response to Question 29, such as, for example, the UDRP, URS, Sunrise Period and the Trademark Clearinghouse, or the PDDRP as set forth in Question 29.

1.2 Policies for Handling Complaints Regarding Abuse

Abuse complaints may be submitted to the Abuse Prevention Manager by email (likely to be “abuse” (at) RegistryOperatorWebsite.HOME or similar) or by written mail to: Attention: Abuse Prevention Manager ⁄ 3029 Prospect Avenue ⁄ Cleveland ⁄ OH ⁄ 44115 ⁄ United States, or other address as identified on .HOME’s registry website.  This will allow the complaint to be formally recognized and processed.

A complaint should include:  the .HOME domain name at issue; the nature of the alleged abuse; the date(s) the abuse allegedly occurred; any materials the claimant may have illustrating the abuse (for example, spam email, screen shots, etc.); any authority the complainant may have with regard to the claim (for example, if the complainant is with law enforcement); and the claimant’s contact information, including a preferred method of contact (such as email).

Complaints must be submitted in English.  In the event a complainant is not capable of submitting a complaint in English, or is otherwise incapable of communicating in English, DH will take commercially reasonable efforts to accommodate the complainant and determine an effective means of communication, but makes no guarantee that any complaint will be processed in any language outside of English.

Commercially reasonable attempts will be made to respond to the complainant via the method of communication identified in the complaint (e.g., by email or written mail; by phone if requested and reasonable).  If the complaint contains no contact information, or incomplete contact information that does not allow a response, the complaint will be dismissed.

Once received, a complaint will be assigned a unique identifier, which will be maintained during the life cycle of the complaint and communicated to the complainant upon DH’s first response to the complainant.

Every complaint will be initially screened to determine if it is to be substantively processed or otherwise identified as incomplete, frivolous, incomprehensible, stating a claim for which no relief can be granted, non-topical or otherwise not subject to substantive processing.  DH will endeavor to make this threshold determination within ten business days of receiving a complaint, or three business days if the complainant is a member of law enforcement.

If the complaint is deemed to be incomplete or incomprehensible, DH will respond to the complainant asking for a complete and comprehensible complaint, and will cease processing the complaint until a complete and comprehensible complaint is received.  If the complaint is deemed frivolous, DH will reply that the complaint is frivolous and invite the complainant to justify why the complaint is not frivolous; if the complainant cannot overcome this burden, the complaint will be dismissed.  If the complaint is non-topical or makes claim for which no relief can be granted under .HOME’s Abuse Prevention and Mitigation Plan, DH will respond accordingly and invite the claimant to respond or direct the claimant to a more appropriate forum or mechanism for addressing the claimant’s complaint, such as the UDRP, other rights protection mechanisms as set forth in the answer to Question 29, civil litigation in an appropriate forum, or referral to law enforcement.  In either event, DH will cease processing such a complaint until a response is received from the complainant.  If a review of the complaint determines that the complaint cannot be substantively processed for any other reason, DH will respond to the complainant accordingly and processing of the complaint will cease until a response is received from complainant.

In the event DH’s initial screening determines that the complaint is complete, non-frivolous, comprehensible, states a claim for which relief can be granted, topical and otherwise capable of substantive processing by DH, DH will substantively process the complaint.  DH will establish and follow a variety of methods for tracking claimed abuse and for addressing the nature of the alleged abuse.  These methods may include, but not be limited to, coordination with NAR, law enforcement, engaging security vendors, internal investigations, engaging our back-end provider (Verisign) and employing Verisign’s resources regarding abuse detection⁄prevention, engaging the registrar of record, and any other industry-standard mechanisms for addressing domain abuse.  Complaint processing, analysis and resource allocation will be on a case-by-case basis as needed for each complaint.

In the event DH initiates substantive processing of a complaint, DH will inform NAR, the registrant of record, the registrar of record and the complainant of such initiation, and will submit requests for information, comment or feedback as required on a case-by-case basis for each complaint.  The registrant of record will be contacted via the WHOIS information associated with the registration.  DH will work with NAR and the registrar of record to determine the nature of the alleged abuse, and the necessary and appropriate steps to address same.  DH will contact the registrar of record by phone, email or other method as identified in the agreement between DH and the registrar.

At any time during processing of a complaint, NAR may contact DH and direct DH to take any of the actions set forth herein (such as, for example, suspending the domain pending further investigation).  NAR is committed to working with DH in the fair and reasonable implementation of the Plan as set forth herein, and in the fair and reasonable processing of each complaint.

DH acknowledges that the registrar of record may initiate its own abuse investigation, at which point DH will process the complaint in parallel with the registrar.  Again, DH will work with the registrar of record with regard to contacting the registrant (if the registrar wishes to be the point of contact with the registrant) and processing the complaint.

During DH’s processing of a complaint, DH may elect to suspend, lock, or otherwise place the domain at issue on hold pending resolution of the complaint.  The registrant of record will be sent notice via contact information in the WHOIS that the domain will be suspended, locked or otherwise placed on hold pending resolution of the complaint.  If the registrant of record chooses to respond, DH will consider their response and may release the suspension, lock or hold if appropriate.  DH is committed to a fair and impartial process for addressing abuse complaints, and will endeavor to ensure that mistakes in processing or suspending⁄locking⁄holding do not occur, but DH recognizes that rarely false-positive suspension may occur.  In this event, DH notes that the domain at issue will not be deleted (until potentially completion of complaint processing), which will allow for quick correction of the suspension⁄lock⁄hold in the rare case of a false-positive.  In any event, DH will comply with any appropriate court or tribunal order directed to DH to release a suspended⁄locked⁄on-hold domain if complainant provides such to DH.

After processing of a complaint, DH may approve or deny the claim, make comments on the claim, conditionally approve the claim, suspend the claim pending further action, and may take any action set forth herein (such as, for example, cancelling or transferring the domain at issue).  In matters in which the ultimate determination as to whether the substance of a claim is illegal or otherwise more appropriately determined by a court or tribunal in other fora, DH may delay final processing of a claim, pending resolution and⁄or direction in the matter from such court or tribunal.  In matters in which the ultimate determination as to whether an abuse has occurred is more appropriately determined by NAR in its position as steward of the .HOME gTLD, DH may delay final processing of a claim pending NAR’s determination of appropriate action.

DH will notify the claimant, NAR, the registrant of record and the registrar of record of DH’s final determination regarding the complaint and any actions DH may take⁄have taken in regard to the matter.  The registrant (or entity claimed to have abusively acted) or the claimant may, within ten business days of DH sending out such notice, inform DH that such entity wishes DH to reconsider its decision.  Such reconsideration request should be submitted to the Abuse Prevention Manager in the same manner as the complaint was submitted, or otherwise as provided in the notice of DH’s decision.  Any reconsideration request must address why reconsideration should be considered, and should identify any new information which was not considered by DH in DH’s final decision, and which would be considered material enough to justify a reversal of DH’s determination.  If the reconsideration request contains such material new information, DH may decide to reopen processing of the complaint, and would then notify NAR, the complainant, the registrant, the registrar and any other interested parties of such reopening. If the reconsideration request fails to contain any material new information, or if DH that the material new information provided is not sufficient for DH to change its position, DH will deny the reconsideration request.  At that point DH will cease processing the claim, but will still respond to appropriate court or tribunal orders directed to DH regarding the matter.

In the event a complainant identifies themselves as a member of law enforcement investigating a potential illegal activity, DH will endeavor to initially respond to such a complaint within twenty-four hours, but in no event less than seventy-two hours, and may respond sooner if the complaint requests a quicker turnaround and provides an adequate reason for needing a quicker turnaround.  DH is committed to working with law enforcement relating to abusive actions in the .HOME gTLD, and will put forth commercially reasonable efforts to communicate with law enforcement, accommodate law enforcement requests and generally work with law enforcement towards expedited processing of a complaint.

DH is a Delaware limited liability company with a principal place of business at 3029 Prospect Avenue, Cleveland Ohio 44115, and is subject to Ohio and Delaware law.  In the event DH receives a court or tribunal order for any reason, DH will review the order to determine its reasonableness and the extent to which the issuing court or tribunal has authority over DH, NAR or any party implicated in a complaint.  DH may consult with outside legal counsel in such a review.  If DH elects to respond or take action pursuant to the order, DH will endeavor to do so within any time frame set forth in the order, so long as practicable.  

For complaints arising from matters relating to abuse or misuse of NAR’s policies governing use of the .HOME gTLD (“NAR Policies”), DH will work with NAR to determine the processing of such a complaint.  In complaints relating to NAR Policies, NAR may choose to invoke any of its own policies or procedures which will be developed and adapted to address abuses or violations of NAR Policies.  DH will work with NAR, at NAR’s direction, to assist in processing any claim.  DH will also comply with any direction to action given by NAR related to suspension, lock, hold, transfer or cancellation of any domain in a complaint primarily regarding NAR Policies.  As previously stated, NAR is committed to the fair and impartial implementation of the Plan.

DH is committed to preventing and mitigating abuse in the .HOME gTLD, and will comply with all terms regarding such in the final version of the Registry Agreement and all consensus policies relating to such.  Working with NAR and registrars, DH will remain flexible on the Plan and its implementation policies⁄procedures to address future and unconventional abuses which are not currently known, and looks forward to working with other gTLD registry operators and ICANN in determining industry standard abuse prevention and mitigation plans, policies and procedures.

1.3 Proposed Measures for Removal of Orphan Glue Records

Although orphan glue records often support correct and ordinary operation of the Domain Name System (DNS), registry operators will be required to remove orphan glue records (as defined at http:⁄⁄www.icann.org⁄en⁄committees⁄security⁄sac048.pdf) when provided with evidence in written form that such records are present in connection with malicious conduct. DH’s selected backend registry services provider’s (Verisign’s) registration system is specifically designed to not allow orphan glue records. Registrars are required to delete⁄move all dependent DNS records before they are allowed to delete the parent domain.

To prevent orphan glue records, Verisign performs the following checks before removing a domain or name server: 

Checks during domain delete: 

* Parent domain delete is not allowed if any other domain in the zone refers to the child name server. 

* If the parent domain is the only domain using the child name server, then both the domain and the glue record are removed from the zone.

Check during explicit name server delete: 

* Verisign confirms that the current name server is not referenced by any domain name (in-zone) before deleting the name server. 

Zone-file impact:

* If the parent domain references the child name server AND if other domains in the zone also reference it AND if the parent domain name is assigned a serverHold status, then the parent domain goes out of the zone but the name server glue record does not. 

* If no domains reference a name server, then the zone file removes the glue record.

1.4 Resourcing Plans

Details related to resourcing plans for the initial implementation and ongoing maintenance of DH’s abuse plan are provided in Section 2 of this response. 

1.5 Measures to Promote Whois Accuracy

1.5.1 	Authentication of Registrant Information 

As set forth in the answer to Question 18, only NAR, REALTORS®, NAR members, NAR affiliates (including societies and counsels), NAR licensees and parties otherwise in a contractual relationship with NAR will be permitted registration in .HOME.  Each of these individuals or entities may be identified by a unique identifier, as is the case with all REALTORS®.  This unique identifier is created and supplied by NAR, maintained in NAR databases, and updated accordingly (such as, for example, when a REALTOR®’s membership ceases, the identifier is updated accordingly).

During the domain application process, the applicant will input their unique identifier (supplied by NAR), and the inputted identifier will be checked against NAR’s database to ensure that the applicant is in good status.  In this regard the registrant information of all applications are pre-authenticated by NAR, as NAR will only issue an identifier, and maintain that identifier’s status, if the individual⁄entity to which the identifier is assigned is in good standing with NAR (such as, for example, retains their position as a REALTOR®).

NAR will work with accredited registrars to ensure that required back-end functionality for pinging NAR’s database to check identifiers is readily available.

1.5.2 	Regular Monitoring of Registration Data for Accuracy and Completeness

NAR regularly monitors its member database to ensure that accurate membership status is maintained.  For example, a real estate professional may become a REALTOR® if the professional otherwise qualifies under NAR’s standards and maintains payment of dues.  In the event the REALTOR® fails to maintain payment of their dues, the database reflects that the individual is no longer a REALTOR® in good standing.

In this regard the NAR database maintains an accurate database of registration information relating to REALTOR® and NAR members which is updated in real time with membership status and contact information supplied by REALTORS® and members.  NAR will inform DH in the event that a REALTOR® or a member ceases to be a REALTOR® or a member, and DH will modify any implicated domains accordingly.

DH recognizes that monitoring of registration data for accuracy and completeness is an important matter to ICANN and many ICANN stakeholders.  DH will comply with all monitoring provisions in the final version of the Registry Agreement and all consensus policies relating to monitoring.  DH will work with all accredited registrars towards this goal.  DH will also work with NAR to establish procedures for cross-checking WHOIS data with NAR’s REALTOR® and membership databases.

Verisign, DH’s selected backend registry services provider, has established policies and procedures to encourage registrar compliance with ICANN’s Whois accuracy requirements. Verisign provides the following services to DH for incorporation into its full-service registry operations.

Registrar self certification.  

The self-certification program consists, in part, of evaluations applied equally to all operational ICANN accredited registrars and conducted from time-to-time throughout the year. Process steps are as follows:

* Verisign sends an email notification to the ICANN primary registrar contact, requesting that the contact go to a designated URL, log in with his⁄her Web ID and password, and complete and submit the online form. The contact must submit the form within 15 business days of receipt of the notification. 

* When the form is submitted, Verisign sends the registrar an automated email confirming that the form was successfully submitted.

* Verisign reviews the submitted form to ensure the certifications are compliant.

* Verisign sends the registrar an email notification if the registrar is found to be compliant in all areas. 

* If a review of the response indicates that the registrar is out of compliance or if Verisign has follow-up questions, the registrar has 10 days to respond to the inquiry.

* If the registrar does not respond within 15 business days of receiving the original notification, or if it does not respond to the request for additional information, Verisign sends the registrar a Breach Notice and gives the registrar 30 days to cure the breach.

* If the registrar does not cure the breach, Verisign terminates the Registry-Registrar Agreement (RRA). 


Whois data reminder process. Verisign regularly reminds registrars of their obligation to comply with ICANN’s Whois Data Reminder Policy, which was adopted by ICANN as a consensus policy on 27 March 2003 (http:⁄⁄www.icann.org⁄en⁄registrars⁄wdrp.htm). Verisign sends a notice to all registrars once a year reminding them of their obligation to be diligent in validating the Whois information provided during the registration process, to investigate claims of fraudulent Whois information, and to cancel domain name registrations for which Whois information is determined to be invalid. 

1.5.3 	Use of Registrars

As of the submission date of this application, ICANN has not provided final guidance as to the nature and the details of the procedures which will be implemented by registrars to ensure accuracy and completeness of WHOIS data.  DH has followed and will continue to follow closely the progress of the negotiations between ICANN and the Registrar Negotiations Team (NT) regarding the revised Registrar Accreditation Agreement (RAA).  DH acknowledges the interests of law enforcement agencies (LEA), who generally are seeking greater openness, accuracy and accountability in WHOIS data.  DH also acknowledges the countervailing position of those who wish to maintain WHOIS privacy, and those (such as registrars) who wish to keep WHOIS costs down.

In the 1 March 2012 Progress Report on Negotiations on the Registrar Accreditation Agreement, ICANN notes that ICANN and the NT are currently undertaking a “comprehensive review” of the RAA and addressing twelve enumerated requests from LEA relating to WHOIS accuracy, accountability and completeness.  ICANN and the NT appear to have an agreement in principle on eleven of the twelve principals, agreeing in principle on (1) guidelines for Privacy⁄Proxy Accreditation Services; (2) a gross negligence standard for knowledge in permitting criminal activity regarding WHOIS information; (3) registrar contact information; (4) public display of registrar officer information; (5) registrar ownership; (6) notice of change to registrar; (7) registrar certification; (8) registrar accountability and disclosure obligations; (10) validation of WHOIS data; (11) abuse point of contact; and (12) SLA for port 43 servers – while not having an agreement in principle on (9) registrar collection and maintenance of data on the persons initiating requests for registrations, as well as source IP addresses and financial transaction information.  ICANN and the NT are also addressing approximately twenty-two other issues relating to the RAA, of which approximately half have an agreement in principle.

DH is committed to support WHOIS accuracy and completeness procedures and policies which support the WHOIS policies and procedures which result from eventual agreement between ICANN and the NT regarding matters of WHOIS accuracy, accountability and openness as set forth in the final version of the RAA.

1.6 Controls to Ensure Proper Access to Domain Functions

To ensure proper access to domain functions, DH incorporates Verisign’s Registry-Registrar Two-Factor Authentication Service into its full-service registry operations. The service is designed to improve domain name security and assist registrars in protecting the accounts they manage by providing another level of assurance that only authorized personnel can communicate with the registry. As part of the service, dynamic one-time passwords (OTPs) augment the user names and passwords currently used to process update, transfer, and⁄or deletion requests. These one-time passwords enable transaction processing to be based on requests that are validated both by “what users know” (i.e., their user name and password) and “what users have” (i.e., a two-factor authentication credential with a one-time-password).

Registrars can use the one-time-password when communicating directly with Verisign’s Customer Service department as well as when using the registrar portal to make manual updates, transfers, and⁄or deletion transactions. The Two-Factor Authentication Service is an optional service offered to registrars that execute the Registry-Registrar Two-Factor Authentication Service Agreement. As shown in Figure 28-1, the registrars’ authorized contacts use the OTP to enable strong authentication when they contact the registry. There is no charge for the Registry-Registrar Two-Factor Authentication Service. It is enabled only for registrars that wish to take advantage of the added security provided by the service.   

Figure 28-1: See DotHome LLC_Q28_Figures

2. TECHNICAL PLAN THAT IS ADEQUATELY RESOURCED IN THE PLANNED COSTS DETAILED IN THE FINANCIAL SECTION

Resource Planning

DH’s management team is an experienced team which has managed a gTLD (.JOBS) for over six years and is well-acquainted with domain abuse prevention and mitigation. 

During initial operation of .HOME, the Abuse Prevention Manager will be the General Counsel of DH.  In processing a complaint, the Abuse Prevention Manager may seek the assistance of any of the Executive Management Personnel, including the Vice President of Registry Operations for .HOME policy-related issues.  The Abuse Prevention Manager may also seek the assistance of either or both Customer Support personnel and Technical Labor personnel, depending upon the nature of the complaint and the volume of complaints.  The Abuse Prevention Manager may also engage the services of outside legal counsel for advice or representation if the nature of a complaint or processing the complaint requires.

Operations of the Abuse Prevention Manager will scale as needed to accommodate the volume and nature of complaints received, including shifting allocations of time from Customer Support personnel and Technical Labor personnel.  In the event registration volume and related income allow, and complaint volume dictates, additional personnel may be added to accommodate the complaints, up to and including addition of a dedicated Abuse Prevention Manager with a staff commensurate to need.

Costs for DH’s operations as detailed above are addressed in the response to Question 47.  Specifically, $20,000 has been attributed to legal as part of general administrative expenses per year (see table 3 provided in response to Question 47).  In addition, per the Financial Projections Template submitted in response to Question 46, $50,000 per year is budgeted under Other Operating Costs in case of unexpected contingencies, such as outside legal counsel.

The National Association of Realtors is the largest trade association in North America.  NAR has an experienced management team, compliance team and legal team for overseeing use of their REALTOR mark. With regard to abuse complaints that relate to NAR Policies, NAR will deploy their brand management resources to establish, implement and maintain internal procedures for addressing such claims.  Such procedures may involve input from management, compliance and legal, and legal may consult with outside legal counsel.  NAR has sufficient resources and personnel to provide the compliance services attributed to NAR herein.

NAR’s internal costs for abuse complaint procedures will be borne by NAR, and are thus not included in the response to Question 47.

Resource Planning Specific to Backend Registry Activities

Verisign, DH’s selected backend registry services provider, is an experienced backend registry provider that has developed a set of proprietary resourcing models to project the number and type of personnel resources necessary to operate a TLD. Verisign routinely adjusts these staffing models to account for new tools and process innovations. These models enable Verisign to continually right-size its staff to accommodate projected demand and meet service level agreements as well as Internet security and stability requirements. Using the projected usage volume for the most likely scenario (defined in Question 46, Template 1 – Financial Projections: Most Likely) as an input to its staffing models, Verisign derived the necessary personnel levels required for this gTLD’s initial implementation and ongoing maintenance. Verisign’s pricing for the backend registry services it provides to DH fully accounts for cost related to this infrastructure, which is provided as “Total Critical Registry Function Cash Outflows” (Template 1, Line IIb.G) within the Question 46 financial projections response. 

Verisign employs more than 1,040 individuals of which more than 775 comprise its technical work force. (Current statistics are publicly available in Verisign’s quarterly filings.) Drawing from this pool of on-hand and fully committed technical resources, Verisign has maintained DNS operational accuracy and stability 100 percent of the time for more than 13 years for .com, proving Verisign’s ability to align personnel resource growth to the scale increases of Verisign’s TLD service offerings.

Verisign projects it will use the following personnel roles, which are described in Section 5 of the response to Question 31, Technical Overview of Proposed Registry, to support abuse prevention and mitigation:

* Application Engineers: 19
* Business Continuity Personnel: 3
* Customer Affairs Organization: 9
* Customer Support Personnel: 36
* Information Security Engineers: 11
* Network Administrators: 11
* Network Architects: 4
* Network Operations Center (NOC) Engineers: 33
* Project Managers: 25
* Quality Assurance Engineers: 11
* Systems Architects: 9

To implement and manage the .HOME gTLD as described in this application, Verisign, DH’s selected backend registry services provider, scales, as needed, the size of each technical area now supporting its portfolio of TLDs. Consistent with its resource modeling, Verisign periodically reviews the level of work to be performed and adjusts staff levels for each technical area. 

When usage projections indicate a need for additional staff, Verisign’s internal staffing group uses an in-place staffing process to identify qualified candidates. These candidates are then interviewed by the lead of the relevant technical area. By scaling one common team across all its TLDs instead of creating a new entity to manage only this proposed gTLD, Verisign realizes significant economies of scale and ensures its TLD best practices are followed consistently. This consistent application of best practices helps ensure the security and stability of both the Internet and this proposed gTLD, as Verisign holds all contributing staff members accountable to the same procedures that guide its execution of the Internet’s largest TLDs (i.e., .com and .net). Moreover, by augmenting existing teams, Verisign affords new employees the opportunity to be mentored by existing senior staff. This mentoring minimizes start-up learning curves and helps ensure that new staff members properly execute their duties.

3. POLICIES AND PROCEDURES IDENTIFY AND ADDRESS THE ABUSIVE USE OF REGISTERED NAMES AT STARTUP AND ON AN ONGOING BASIS

The anti-abuse policies and procedures set forth in the answers to this Question 28 address, and are applicable, to abusive use of registered names in .HOME at both startup and on an ongoing basis.

3.1 	Start-Up Anti-Abuse Policies and Procedures

DH’s anti-abuse policies and procedures set forth above will be available as of start-up of .HOME.  Further, the requirement set forth in section 1.5 above regarding submission of a unique identifier for applicants for domains will be in place for start-up.

Verisign, DH’s selected backend registry services provider, provides the following domain name abuse prevention services, which DH incorporates into its full-service registry operations. These services are available at the time of domain name registration.

Registry Lock. The Registry Lock Service allows registrars to offer server-level protection for their registrants’ domain names. A registry lock can be applied during the initial standup of the domain name or at any time that the registry is operational. 

Specific Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) status codes are set on the domain name to prevent malicious or inadvertent modifications, deletions, and transfers. Typically, these ‘server’ level status codes can only be updated by the registry. The registrar only has ‘client’ level codes and cannot alter ‘server’ level status codes. The registrant must provide a pass phrase to the registry before any updates are made to the domain name. However, with Registry Lock, provided via Verisign, DH’s subcontractor, registrars can also take advantage of server status codes.

The following EPP server status codes are applicable for domain names: (i) serverUpdateProhibited, (ii) serverDeleteProhibited, and (iii) serverTransferProhibited. These statuses may be applied individually or in combination.

The EPP also enables setting host (i.e., name server) status codes to prevent deleting or renaming a host or modifying its IP addresses. Setting host status codes at the registry reduces the risk of inadvertent disruption of DNS resolution for domain names.

The Registry Lock Service is used in conjunction with a registrar’s proprietary security measures to bring a greater level of security to registrants’ domain names and help mitigate potential for unintended deletions, transfers, and⁄or updates.

Two components comprise the Registry Lock Service:

* DH and⁄or its registrars provides Verisign, DH’s selected provider of backend registry services, with a list of the domain names to be placed on the server status codes. During the term of the service agreement, the registrar can add domain names to be placed on the server status codes and⁄or remove domain names currently placed on the server status codes. Verisign then manually authenticates that the registrar submitting the list of domain names is the registrar-of-record for such domain names.

* If DH and⁄or its registrars requires changes (including updates, deletes, and transfers) to a domain name placed on a server status code, Verisign follows a secure, authenticated process to perform the change. This process includes a request from a DH-authorized representative for Verisign to remove the specific registry status code, validation of the authorized individual by Verisign, removal of the specified server status code, registrar completion of the desired change, and a request from the DH-authorized individual to reinstate the server status code on the domain name. This process is designed to complement automated transaction processing through the Shared Registration System (SRS) by using independent authentication by trusted registry experts. 

DH intends to charge registrars based on the market value of the Registry Lock Service. A tiered pricing model is expected, with each tier having an annual fee based on per domain name⁄host and the number of domain names and hosts to be placed on Registry Lock server status code(s). 

3.2 	Ongoing Anti-Abuse Policies and Procedures

DH’s anti-abuse policies and procedures set forth in the answers to this Question 28 will be available on an on-going basis for .HOME.  Further, the requirement set forth in section 1.5 above regarding submission of a unique identifier also will apply on an ongoing basis.

3.2.1 Policies and Procedures That Identify Malicious or Abusive Behavior

Verisign, DH’s selected backend registry services provider, provides the following service to DH for incorporation into its full-service registry operations.

Malware scanning service. Registrants are often unknowing victims of malware exploits. Verisign has developed proprietary code to help identify malware in the zones it manages, which in turn helps registrars by identifying malicious code hidden in their domain names. 

Verisign’s malware scanning service helps prevent websites from infecting other websites by scanning web pages for embedded malicious content that will infect visitors’ websites. Verisign’s malware scanning technology uses a combination of in-depth malware behavioral analysis, anti-virus results, detailed malware patterns, and network analysis to discover known exploits for the particular scanned zone. If malware is detected, the service sends the registrar a report that contains the number of malicious domains found and details about malicious content within its TLD zones. Reports with remediation instructions are provided to help registrars and registrants eliminate the identified malware from the registrant’s website. 

3.2.2 Policies and Procedures That Address the Abusive Use of Registered Names

Suspension processes conducted by backend registry services provider. In the case of domain name abuse, DH will determine whether to take down the subject domain name as set forth in Section 1 of the answer to this Question 28. Verisign, DH’s selected backend registry services provider, will follow the following auditable processes to comply with the suspension request.

Figure 28-2: See DotHome LLC_Q28_Figures

Verisign Suspension Notification. DH submits the suspension request to Verisign for processing, documented by:

* Threat domain name
* Registry incident number 
* Incident narrative, threat analytics, screen shots to depict abuse, and⁄or other evidence
* Threat classification 
* Threat urgency description
* Recommended timeframe for suspension⁄takedown 
* Technical details (e.g., Whois records, IP addresses, hash values, anti-virus detection results⁄nomenclature, name servers, domain name statuses that are relevant to the suspension) 
* Incident response, including surge capacity 

Verisign Notification Verification. When Verisign receives a suspension request from DH, it performs the following verification procedures:

* Validate that all the required data appears in the notification.
* Validate that the request for suspension is for a registered domain name.
* Return a case number for tracking purposes.

Suspension Rejection. If required data is missing from the suspension request, or the domain name is not registered, the request will be rejected and returned to DH with the following information:

* Threat domain name
* Registry incident number 
* Verisign case number
* Error reason

Registrar Notification. Once Verisign has performed the domain name suspension, and upon DH request, Verisign notifies the registrar of the suspension. If DH does not request that Verisign notify the registrar, DH will notify the registrar.  Registrar notification includes the following information:

* Threat domain name
* Registry incident number 
* Verisign case number 
* Classification of type of domain name abuse
* Evidence of abuse
* Anti-abuse contact name and number
* Suspension status
* Date⁄time of domain name suspension

Registrant Notification. Once Verisign has performed the domain name suspension, and upon DH request, Verisign notifies the registrant of the suspension. If DH does not request that Verisign notify the registrant, DH will notify the registrant.  Registrant notification includes the following information:

* Threat domain name
* Registry incident number 
* Verisign case number 
* Classification of type of domain name abuse
* Evidence of abuse
* Registrar anti-abuse contact name and number

Domain Suspension. Verisign places the domain to be suspended on the following statuses:

* serverUpdateProhibited 
* serverDeleteProhibited
* serverTransferProhibited
* serverHold 

Suspension Acknowledgement. Verisign notifies DH that the suspension has been completed. Acknowledgement of the suspension includes the following information:

* Threat domain name
* Registry incident number 
* Verisign case number 
* Case number
* Domain name
* DH abuse contact name and number, or registrar abuse contact name and number
* Suspension status

4. WHEN EXECUTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REGISTRY AGREEMENT, PLANS WILL RESULT IN COMPLIANCE WITH CONTRACTUAL REQUIREMENTS

It is DH’s good faith belief that the plans and procedures set forth herein, when executed, will place .HOME in compliance with the contractual requirements set forth in the Registry Agreement.  As a final version of the Registry Agreement has not been provided, DH is committed to being in compliance with all abuse-prevention terms and obligations set forth in the final version of the Registry Agreement, and will amend and augment any and all anti-abuse plans and procedures set forth herein to be in compliance with the terms and obligations regarding anti-abuse plans and procedures set forth in the final version of the Registry Agreement and any Consensus Policies relating to abuse prevention and mitigation.

5. TECHNICAL PLAN SCOPE⁄SCALE THAT IS CONSISTENT WITH THE OVERALL BUSINESS APPROACH AND PLANNED SIZE OF THE REGISTRY

Scope⁄Scale Consistency

DH’s anti-abuse plans and procedures set forth herein are consistent with the technical, operational and financial approach and details set forth in other parts of this application, and other answers to the Questions therein.  As detailed in answers to Question 47, DH has allocated more than adequate levels of resources on hand and committed to enable full functionality of the plan and procedures, and DH’s experienced management team and new hires, along with the resources of NAR and Verisign, are more than capable of successfully carrying out the functions set forth herein.

Scope⁄Scale Consistency Specific to Backend Registry Activities

Verisign, DH’s selected backend registry services provider, is an experienced backend registry provider that has developed and uses proprietary system scaling models to guide the growth of its TLD supporting infrastructure. These models direct Verisign’s infrastructure scaling to include, but not be limited to, server capacity, data storage volume, and network throughput that are aligned to projected demand and usage patterns. Verisign periodically updates these models to account for the adoption of more capable and cost-effective technologies. 

Verisign’s scaling models are proven predictors of needed capacity and related cost. As such, they provide the means to link the projected infrastructure needs of the .HOME gTLD with necessary implementation and sustainment cost. Using the projected usage volume for the most likely scenario (defined in Question 46, Template 1 – Financial Projections: Most Likely) as an input to its scaling models, Verisign derived the necessary infrastructure required to implement and sustain this gTLD. Verisign’s pricing for the backend registry services it provides to DH fully accounts for cost related to this infrastructure, which is provided as “Other Operating Cost” (Template 1, Line I.L) within the Question 46 financial projections response.

1 MECHANISMS DESIGNED TO PREVENT ABUSIVE REGISTRATIONS

Rights protection is a core objective of DotHome LLC (“DH”). DH will implement and adhere to any rights protection mechanisms (RPMs) that may be mandated from time to time by ICANN, including each mandatory RPM set forth in the Trademark Clearinghouse model contained in the Registry Agreement, specifically Specification 7. DH acknowledges that, at a minimum, ICANN requires a Sunrise period, a Trademark Claims period, and interaction with the Trademark Clearinghouse with respect to the registration of domain names for the .HOME gTLD. It should be noted that because ICANN, as of the time of this application submission, has not issued final guidance with respect to the Trademark Clearinghouse, DH cannot fully detail the specific implementation of the Trademark Clearinghouse within this application. DH will adhere to all processes and procedures to comply with ICANN guidance once this guidance is finalized.

As described in this response, DH will implement a Sunrise period and Trademark Claims service with respect to the registration of domain names within the .HOME gTLD. Certain aspects of the Sunrise period and⁄or Trademark Claims service may be administered on behalf of DH by DH-approved registrars or by subcontractors of DH, such as its selected backend registry services provider, Verisign. DH will also use, as detailed in the answer to Question 18, eligibility requirements which will also provide rights protection and which will be performed by DH and⁄or the National Association of Realtors (ʺNARʺ), with enactment (for example, suspension or transfer) by DH.

Sunrise Period. As provided by the Trademark Clearinghouse model set forth in the ICANN Applicant Guidebook, the Sunrise service pre-registration procedure for domain names continues for at least 30 days prior to the launch of the general registration of domain names in the gTLD (unless DH decides to offer a longer Sunrise period).

During the Sunrise period, holders of marks that have been previously validated by the Trademark Clearinghouse receive notice of domain names that are an identical match (as defined in the ICANN Applicant Guidebook) to their mark(s). Such notice is in accordance with ICANN’s requirements and is provided by DH either directly or through DH-approved registrars.

DH requires all registrants, either directly or through DH-approved registrars, to i) affirm that said registrants meet the Sunrise Eligibility Requirements (SER) and ii) submit to the Sunrise Dispute Resolution Policy (SDRP) consistent with Section 6 of the Trademark Clearinghouse model. At a minimum DH recognizes and honors all word marks for which a proof of use was submitted and validated by the Trademark Clearinghouse as well as any additional eligibility requirements as specified in Question 18.

During the Sunrise period, DH and⁄or DH-approved registrars, as applicable, are responsible for determining whether each domain name is eligible to be registered (including in accordance with the SERs).

Trademark Claims Service. As provided by the Trademark Clearinghouse model set forth in the ICANN Applicant Guidebook, all new gTLDs will have to provide a Trademark Claims service for a minimum of 60 days after the launch of the general registration of domain names in the gTLD (Trademark Claims period).

During the Trademark Claims period, in accordance with ICANN’s requirements, DH or the DH-approved registrar will send a Trademark Claims Notice to any prospective registrant of a domain name that is an identical match (as defined in the ICANN Applicant Guidebook) to any mark that is validated in the Trademark Clearinghouse. The Trademark Claims Notice will include links to the Trademark Claims as listed in the Trademark Clearinghouse and will be provided at no cost.

Prior to registration of said domain name, DH or the DH-approved registrar will require each prospective registrant to provide the warranties dictated in the Trademark Clearinghouse model set forth in the ICANN Applicant Guidebook. Those warranties will include receipt and understanding of the Trademark Claims Notice and confirmation that registration and use of said domain name will not infringe on the trademark rights of the mark holders listed. Without receipt of said warranties, DH or the DH-approved registrar will not process the domain name registration.

Following the registration of a domain name, the DH-approved registrar will provide a notice of domain name registration to the holders of marks that have been previously validated by the Trademark Clearinghouse and are an identical match. This notice will be as dictated by ICANN. At a minimum DH will recognize and honor all word marks validated by the Trademark Clearinghouse.

Eligibility Restrictions. As set forth in the answer to Question 18, only NAR, REALTORS®, NAR members, NAR affiliates (including societies and counsels), NAR licensees and parties otherwise in a contractual relationship with NAR will be permitted registration in .HOME. As set forth in the answer to Question 28, each of these entities may be identified by a unique identifier, such as is the case with all REALTORS®. This unique identifier is created and supplied by NAR, maintained in NAR databases, and updated accordingly (such as, for example, when a REALTOR®’s membership ceases, the identifier is updated accordingly).

During the domain application process, the applicant will input their unique identifier which will be checked against NAR’s database to ensure that the applicant is in good status. In this regard the registrant information of all applications are pre-authenticated by NAR, as NAR will only issue an identifier, and maintain that identifier’s status, if the individual⁄entity to which the identifier is assigned is in good standing with NAR (such as, for example, retains their position as a REALTOR®).

NAR regularly monitors its member database to ensure that accurate membership status is maintained. For example, a real estate professional may become a REALTOR® if the professional otherwise qualifies under NAR’s standards and maintains payment of dues. In the event the REALTOR® fails to maintain payment of their dues, the database reflects that the individual is no longer a REALTOR® in good standing.

In this regard the NAR database maintains an accurate database of registration information relating to REALTOR® and NAR members which is updated in real time with membership status and contact information supplied by REALTORS® and members. NAR will inform DH in the event that a REALTOR® or a member ceases to be a REALTOR® or a member, and DH will modify any implicated domains accordingly.

DH will work with accredited registrars to ensure that required back-end functionality for pinging NAR’s database to check identifiers is readily available.

2 MECHANISMS DESIGNED TO IDENTIFY AND ADDRESS THE ABUSIVE USE OF REGISTERED NAMES ON AN ONGOING BASIS

In addition to the Sunrise and Trademark Claims services described in Section 1 of this response, DH implements and adheres to RPMs post-launch as mandated by ICANN, and confirms that registrars accredited for the .HOME gTLD are in compliance with these mechanisms. Certain aspects of these post-launch RPMs may be administered on behalf of DH by DH-approved registrars or by subcontractors of DH, such as its selected backend registry services provider, Verisign.

These post-launch RPMs include the established Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy (UDRP), as well as the newer Uniform Rapid Suspension System (URS) and Trademark Post-Delegation Dispute Resolution Procedure (PDDRP). Where applicable, DH will implement all determinations and decisions issued under the corresponding RPM.

After a domain name is registered, trademark holders can object to the registration through the UDRP or URS. Objections to the operation of the gTLD can be made through the PDDRP.

The following descriptions provide implementation details of each post-launch RPM for the .HOME gTLD:

* UDRP: The UDRP provides a mechanism for complainants to object to domain name registrations. The complainant files its objection with a UDRP provider and the domain name registrant has an opportunity to respond. The UDRP provider makes a decision based on the papers filed. If the complainant is successful, ownership of the domain name registration is transferred to the complainant. If the complainant is not successful, ownership of the domain name remains with the domain name registrant. DH and entities operating on its behalf adhere to all decisions rendered by UDRP providers.

* URS: As provided in the Applicant Guidebook, all registries are required to implement the URS. Similar to the UDRP, a complainant files its objection with a URS provider. The URS provider conducts an administrative review for compliance with filing requirements. If the complaint passes review, the URS provider notifies the registry operator and locks the domain. A lock means that the registry restricts all changes to the registration data, but the name will continue to resolve. After the domain is locked, the complaint is served to the domain name registrant, who has an opportunity to respond. If the complainant is successful, the registry operator is informed and the domain name is suspended for the balance of the registration period; the domain name will not resolve to the original website, but to an informational web page provided by the URS provider. If the complainant is not successful, the URS is terminated and full control of the domain name registration is returned to the domain name registrant. Similar to the existing UDRP, DH and entities operating on its behalf adhere to decisions rendered by the URS providers.

* PDDRP: As provided in the Applicant Guidebook, all registries are required to implement the PDDRP. The PDDRP provides a mechanism for a complainant to object to the registry operator’s manner of operation or use of the gTLD. The complainant files its objection with a PDDRP provider, who performs a threshold review. The registry operator has the opportunity to respond and the provider issues its determination based on the papers filed, although there may be opportunity for further discovery and a hearing. DH participates in the PDDRP process as specified in the Applicant Guidebook.

Additional Measures Specific to Rights Protection. DH provides additional measures against potentially abusive registrations. These measures help mitigate phishing, pharming, and other Internet security threats. The measures exceed the minimum requirements for RPMs defined by Specification 7 of the Registry Agreement and are available at the time of registration. These measures include:

* Rapid Takedown or Suspension Based on Court Orders: DH complies promptly with any order from a court of competent jurisdiction that directs it to take any action on a domain name that is within its technical capabilities as a TLD registry. These orders may be issued when abusive content, such as child pornography, counterfeit goods, or illegal pharmaceuticals, is associated with the domain name.

* Anti-Abuse Process: DH implements an anti-abuse process that is executed on domain name takedown requests. The scope of the anti-abuse process includes malicious exploitation of the DNS infrastructure, such as phishing, botnets, and malware.

* Authentication Procedures: Verisign, DH’s selected backend registry services provider, uses two-factor authentication to augment security protocols for telephone, email, and chat communications.

* Registry Lock: This Verisign service allows registrants to lock a domain name at the registry level to protect against both unintended and malicious changes, deletions, and transfers. Only Verisign, as DH’s backend registry services provider, can release the lock; thus all other entities that normally are permitted to update Shared Registration System (SRS) records are prevented from doing so. This lock is released only after the registrar makes the request to unlock.

* Malware Code Identification: This safeguard reduces opportunities for abusive behaviors that use registered domain names in the gTLD. Registrants are often unknowing victims of malware exploits. As DH’s backend registry services provider, Verisign has developed proprietary code to help identify malware in the zones it manages, which in turn helps registrars by identifying malicious code hidden in their domain names.

* DNSSEC Signing Service: Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) helps mitigate pharming attacks that use cache poisoning to redirect unsuspecting users to fraudulent websites or addresses. It uses public key cryptography to digitally sign DNS data when it comes into the system and then validate it at its destination. The .HOME gTLD is DNSSEC-enabled as part of Verisign’s core backend registry services.

3. RESOURCING PLANS

Resource Planning

Resourcing plans for the initial implementation of, and ongoing maintenance for, the rights protection mechanisms in Part 1 of the answer to this Question 29, except for those relating to eligibility requirements, are set forth in the answer to Question 49(a) – contingency planning (detailed further below). As ICANN has not issued final guidance with regard to the Trademark Clearinghouse, and particularly the costs associated with the Clearinghouse, subcontractors and backend providers, such as Verisign, have not been able to quote costs and resource allocations for implementation of the Clearinghouse and other RPMs which incorporate the Clearinghouse. DH will determine which entity(ies) will provide which services, and allocate costs and resources accordingly, once ICANN has determined a Clearinghouse cost and DH can determine subcontractor⁄Verisign pricing and availability. In any event, DH has a firm commitment from Verisign that, at minimum, Verisign will work with DH to provide all the necessary resources and services to implement and maintain the RPMs contemplated in this answer, and as set forth in Question 49(a), DH has allocated sufficient committed resources to ensure sufficient resources to cover Verisign’s (or other subcontractor’s) costs.

With regard to the other RPMs identified herein, DH’s management team is an experienced team which has managed an sTLD (.JOBS) for over six years and is well-acquainted with domain abuse prevention and mitigation.

DH internal operations for all RPMs will scale as needed to accommodate the volume and nature of all matters not handled by Verisign or subcontractors, including shifting allocations of time from the management team, General Counsel, Customer Support personnel and Technical Labor personnel. In the event registration volume and related income allow, and RPM matter volume dictates, additional personnel may be added to accommodate the matters, up to and including addition of a dedicated RPM Manager with a staff commensurate to need.

Costs for DH’s operations as detailed above are addressed in the response to Question 47. Specifically, $20,000 has been attributed to legal as part of general administrative expenses per year (see table 3 provided in response to Question 47). In addition, per the Financial Projections Template submitted in response to Question 46, $50,000 per year is budgeted under Other Operating Costs in case of unexpected contingencies, such as the use of outside legal counsel.

With regard to operation of RPMs relating to eligibility requirements, NAR is the largest trade association in North America. NAR has an experienced management team, compliance team and legal team for overseeing use of their REALTOR® mark. With regard to eligibility requirement complaints or other complaints which relate to rights protection which may violate any NAR policy, NAR will establish, implement and maintain internal procedures for addressing such claims. Such procedures may involve input from management, compliance and legal, and legal may consult with outside legal counsel. NAR has sufficient resources and personnel to provide the compliance services attributed to NAR herein.

NAR’s internal costs for abuse complaint procedures will be borne by NAR, and are thus not included in the response to Question 47.

Resource Planning Specific to Backend Registry Activities

Verisign, DH’s selected backend registry services provider, is an experienced backend registry provider that has developed a set of proprietary resourcing models to project the number and type of personnel resources necessary to operate a TLD. Verisign routinely adjusts these staffing models to account for new tools and process innovations. These models enable Verisign to continually right-size its staff to accommodate projected demand and meet service level agreements as well as Internet security and stability requirements. Using the projected usage volume for the most likely scenario (defined in Question 46, Template 1 – Financial Projections: Most Likely) as an input to its staffing models, Verisign derived the necessary personnel levels required for this gTLD’s initial implementation and ongoing maintenance. Verisign’s pricing for the backend registry services it provides to DH fully accounts for cost related to this infrastructure, which is provided as Line IIb.G, Total Critical Registry Function Cash Outflows, within the Question 46 financial projections response.

* Customer Affairs Organization: 9
* Customer Support Personnel: 36
* Information Security Engineers: 11

1 DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF PROCESSES AND SOLUTIONS DEPLOYED TO MANAGE LOGICAL SECURITY ACROSS INFRASTRUCTURE AND SYSTEMS, MONITORING AND DETECTING THREATS AND SECURITY VULNERABILITIES AND TAKING APPROPRIATE STEPS TO RESOLVE THEM

Dot Home LLC’s (“DH”) selected backend registry services provider’s (Verisign’s) comprehensive security policy has evolved over the years as part of managing some of the world’s most critical TLDs. Verisign’s Information Security Policy is the primary guideline that sets the baseline for all other policies, procedures, and standards that Verisign follows. This security policy addresses all of the critical components for the management of backend registry services, including architecture, engineering, and operations.

Verisign’s general security policies and standards with respect to these areas are provided as follows:

* Architecture

Information Security Architecture Standard: This standard establishes the Verisign standard for application and network architecture. The document explains the methods for segmenting application tiers, using authentication mechanisms, and implementing application functions.

Information Security Secure Linux Standard: This standard establishes the information security requirements for all systems that run Linux throughout the Verisign organization.

Information Security Secure Oracle Standard: This standard establishes the information security requirements for all systems that run Oracle throughout the Verisign organization.

Information Security Remote Access Standard: This standard establishes the information security requirements for remote access to terminal services throughout the Verisign organization.

Information Security SSH Standard: This standard establishes the information security requirements for the application of Secure Shell (SSH) on all systems throughout the Verisign organization.

* Engineering

Secure SSL⁄TLS Configuration Standard: This standard establishes the information security requirements for the configuration of Secure Sockets Layer⁄Transport Layer Security (SSL⁄TLS) for all systems throughout the Verisign organization.

Information Security C++ Standards: These standards explain how to use and implement the functions and application programming interfaces (APIs) within C++. The document also describes how to perform logging, authentication, and database connectivity.

Information Security Java Standards: These standards explain how to use and implement the functions and APIs within Java. The document also describes how to perform logging, authentication, and database connectivity.

* Operations

Information Security DNS Standard: This standard establishes the information security requirements for all systems that run DNS systems throughout the Verisign organization.

Information Security Cryptographic Key Management Standard: This standard provides detailed information on both technology and processes for the use of encryption on Verisign information security systems.

Secure Apache Standard: Verisign has a multitude of Apache web servers, which are used in both production and development environments on the Verisign intranet and on the Internet. They provide a centralized, dynamic, and extensible interface to various other systems that deliver information to the end user. Because of their exposure and the confidential nature of the data that these systems host, adequate security measures must be in place. The Secure Apache Standard establishes the information security requirements for all systems that run Apache web servers throughout the Verisign organization.

Secure Sendmail Standard: Verisign uses sendmail servers in both the production and development environments on the Verisign intranet and on the Internet. Sendmail allows users to communicate with one another via email. The Secure Sendmail Standard establishes the information security requirements for all systems that run sendmail servers throughout the Verisign organization.

Secure Logging Standard: This standard establishes the information security logging requirements for all systems and applications throughout the Verisign organization. Where specific standards documents have been created for operating systems or applications, the logging standards have been detailed. This document covers all technologies.

Patch Management Standard: This standard establishes the information security patch and upgrade management requirements for all systems and applications throughout Verisign.

* General

Secure Password Standard: Because passwords are the most popular and, in many cases, the sole mechanism for authenticating a user to a system, great care must be taken to help ensure that passwords are “strong” and secure. The Secure Password Standard details requirements for the use and implementation of passwords.

Secure Anti-Virus Standard: Verisign must be protected continuously from computer viruses and other forms of malicious code. These threats can cause significant damage to the overall operation and security of the Verisign network. The Secure Anti-Virus Standard describes the requirements for minimizing the occurrence and impact of these incidents.

Security processes and solutions for the .HOME TLD are based on the standards defined above, each of which is derived from Verisign’s experience and industry best practice. These standards comprise the framework for the overall security solution and applicable processes implemented across all products under Verisign’s management. The security solution and applicable processes include, but are not limited to:

* System and network access control (e.g., monitoring, logging, and backup)
* Independent assessment and periodic independent assessment reports
* Denial of service (DoS) and distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack mitigation
* Computer and network incident response policies, plans, and processes
* Minimization of risk of unauthorized access to systems or tampering with registry data
* Intrusion detection mechanisms, threat analysis, defenses, and updates
* Auditing of network access
* Physical security

Further details of these processes and solutions are provided in Part B of this response.

1.1 Security Policy and Procedures for the Proposed Registry

Specific security policy related details, requested as the bulleted items of Question 30 – Part A, are provided here.

Independent Assessment and Periodic Independent Assessment Reports. To help ensure effective security controls are in place, DH, through its selected backend registry services provider, Verisign, conducts a yearly American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) and Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA) SAS 70 audit on all of its data centers, hosted systems, and applications. During these SAS 70 audits, security controls at the operational, technical, and human level are rigorously tested. These audits are conducted by a certified and accredited third party and help ensure that Verisign in-place environments meet the security criteria specified in Verisign’s customer contractual agreements and are in accordance with commercially accepted security controls and practices. Verisign also performs numerous audits throughout the year to verify its security processes and activities. These audits cover many different environments and technologies and validate Verisign’s capability to protect its registry and DNS resolution environments. Figure 30A-1 lists a subset of the audits that Verisign conducts. For each audit program or certification listed in Figure 30A-1. Verisign has included, as attachments to the Part B component of this response, copies of the assessment reports conducted by the listed third-party auditor. From Verisign’s experience operating registries, it has determined that together these audit programs and certifications provide a reliable means to ensure effective security controls are in place and that these controls are sufficient to meet ICANN security requirements and therefore are commensurate with the guidelines defined by ISO 27001.

Figure 30A-1: See Dot Home LLC_Q30A_security policy

Augmented Security Levels or Capabilities. See Section 5 of this response.

Commitments Made to Registrants Concerning Security Levels. See Section 4 of this response.

2 SECURITY CAPABILITIES ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE OVERALL BUSINESS APPROACH AND PLANNED SIZE OF THE REGISTRY

3 TECHNICAL PLAN ADEQUATELY RESOURCED IN THE PLANNED COSTS DETAILED IN THE FINANCIAL SECTION

Verisign projects it will use the following personnel role, which is described in Section 5 of the response to Question 31, Technical Overview of Proposed Registry, to support its security policy:

* Information Security Engineers: 11

4 SECURITY MEASURES ARE CONSISTENT WITH ANY COMMITMENTS MADE TO REGISTRANTS REGARDING SECURITY LEVELS

Verisign is DH’s selected backend registry services provider. For the .HOME gTLD, no unique security measures or commitments must be made by Verisign or DH to any registrant.

5 SECURITY MEASURES ARE APPROPRIATE FOR THE APPLIED-FOR gTLD STRING (FOR EXAMPLE, APPLICATIONS FOR STRINGS WITH UNIQUE TRUST IMPLICATIONS, SUCH AS FINANCIAL SERVICES-ORIENTED STRINGS, WOULD BE EXPECTED TO PROVIDE A COMMENSURATE LEVEL OF SECURITY)

No unique security measures are necessary to implement the .HOME gTLD. As defined in Section 1 of this response, Verisign, DH’s selected backend registry services provider, commits to providing backend registry services in accordance with the following international and relevant security standards:

* American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) and Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA) SAS 70

* WebTrust⁄SysTrust for Certification Authorities (CA)

Brian D. Johnson	Secretary & General Counsel
F. Matthew Embrescia	President
Ray W. Fassett	Executive Vice President
Scott C. Finerman	Chief Financial Officer
Thomas J. Embrescia	Chairman

New gTLD Application Submitted to ICANN by: Dot Home LLC

String: HOME

Originally Posted: 13 June 2012

Application ID: 1-907-28623

Applicant Information

1. Full legal name

2. Address of the principal place of business

3. Phone number

4. Fax number

5. If applicable, website or URL

Primary Contact

6(a). Name

6(b). Title

6(c). Address

6(d). Phone Number

6(e). Fax Number

6(f). Email Address

Secondary Contact

7(a). Name

7(b). Title

7(c). Address

7(d). Phone Number

7(e). Fax Number

7(f). Email Address

Proof of Legal Establishment

8(a). Legal form of the Applicant

8(b). State the specific national or other jursidiction that defines the type of entity identified in 8(a).

8(c). Attach evidence of the applicant's establishment.

9(a). If applying company is publicly traded, provide the exchange and symbol.

9(b). If the applying entity is a subsidiary, provide the parent company.

9(c). If the applying entity is a joint venture, list all joint venture partners.

Applicant Background

11(a). Name(s) and position(s) of all directors

11(b). Name(s) and position(s) of all officers and partners

11(c). Name(s) and position(s) of all shareholders holding at least 15% of shares

11(d). For an applying entity that does not have directors, officers, partners, or shareholders: Name(s) and position(s) of all individuals having legal or executive responsibility

Applied-for gTLD string

13. Provide the applied-for gTLD string. If an IDN, provide the U-label.

14(a). If an IDN, provide the A-label (beginning with "xn--").

14(b). If an IDN, provide the meaning or restatement of the string in English, that is, a description of the literal meaning of the string in the opinion of the applicant.

14(c). If an IDN, provide the language of the label (in English).

14(c). If an IDN, provide the language of the label (as referenced by ISO-639-1).

14(d). If an IDN, provide the script of the label (in English).

14(d). If an IDN, provide the script of the label (as referenced by ISO 15924).

14(e). If an IDN, list all code points contained in the U-label according to Unicode form.

15(a). If an IDN, Attach IDN Tables for the proposed registry.

15(b). Describe the process used for development of the IDN tables submitted, including consultations and sources used.

15(c). List any variant strings to the applied-for gTLD string according to the relevant IDN tables.

16. Describe the applicant's efforts to ensure that there are no known operational or rendering problems concerning the applied-for gTLD string. If such issues are known, describe steps that will be taken to mitigate these issues in software and other applications.

17. (OPTIONAL) Provide a representation of the label according to the International Phonetic Alphabet (http://www.langsci.ucl.ac.uk/ipa/).

Mission/Purpose

18(a). Describe the mission/purpose of your proposed gTLD.

18(b). How do you expect that your proposed gTLD will benefit registrants, Internet users, and others?

18(c). What operating rules will you adopt to eliminate or minimize social costs?

Community-based Designation

19. Is the application for a community-based TLD?

20(a). Provide the name and full description of the community that the applicant is committing to serve.

20(b). Explain the applicant's relationship to the community identified in 20(a).

20(c). Provide a description of the community-based purpose of the applied-for gTLD.

20(d). Explain the relationship between the applied-for gTLD string and the community identified in 20(a).

20(e). Provide a description of the applicant's intended registration policies in support of the community-based purpose of the applied-for gTLD.

20(f). Attach any written endorsements from institutions/groups representative of the community identified in 20(a).

Geographic Names

21(a). Is the application for a geographic name?

Protection of Geographic Names

22. Describe proposed measures for protection of geographic names at the second and other levels in the applied-for gTLD.

Registry Services

23. Provide name and full description of all the Registry Services to be provided.

Demonstration of Technical & Operational Capability

24. Shared Registration System (SRS) Performance

25. Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)

26. Whois

27. Registration Life Cycle

28. Abuse Prevention and Mitigation

29. Rights Protection Mechanisms

30(a). Security Policy: Summary of the security policy for the proposed registry

© Internet Corporation For Assigned Names and Numbers.